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CHAPTER I
INTER-AMERICAN BACKGROUND

CIiAPTER I

INTER-AMERICAN BACKGROUND
On the first day of his first administration,
President Franklin Roosevelt announced:
In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this
nation to the policy of the Good Neighbor -- the neighbor who resolutely respects h~self and, because he does
so, respects the rights of others -- the neighbor who
respects his obligations and respects the sanctifY of
his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.
Although Roosevelt's verbal touch was needed to give
this foreign policy a name, definite changes in the Latin
American policy of the United States had already appeared
during the preceding Hoover administration.

Indeed, Calvin

Ooolidge was probably defining his own peculiar version of
.'-'

the Good Neighbor policy when he asserted at the Sixth International Conference of the American states at Havana, in 1928,
that "it is better for the people to make their own mistakes
2

than to have someone else make their mistakes for them."
Coolidge's ideas on the Good Neighbor were more
honored in the breach than in the fulfillment.

His military

intervention in Nicaragua in 1926 could not be reconciled
with the concepts of national sovereignty and independence
lFranklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address,
Washington, D. e., March 4, 1933 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1933).

2~uoted in Ricardo J. Alfaro, Commentary on Fan
american Problems (Cambridge: Harvard university-Press,
1938), p. 31.

2

held by Central and South American States.

The Havana

Conference, itself, was marked by bitter debate, the United
States taking an extremely strong stand against the principle of non-intervention.

It is clear that the true basis

of Coolidge's policies lay in his declaration that
The person and property of a citizen are a part
of the general domain of the nation. Even when
abroad • • • • there is a distinct and binding obligation on the part of self-respecting governments to
afford protection to the persons and property of their
citizens, wherever they may be. l
This was in the best interventionist tradition,
closely following the interpretation given the Monroe Doctrine
by Theodore Roosevelt and his successors.

Although taking an active interest in the Latin
American revolutionary movement and among the first to
recognize the independence of the new republics in the
first two decades of the nineteenth century, the United
States failed almost entirely to participate in the first
Sixty years of inter-American cooperation. 2 First attempts
at collaboration were most inauspicious.

This country was

lCalvin Coolidge, "Address to the United Fress,"
April 25, 1927 (~~ Times, ~ril 26, 1927).
2Brief outlines of the origins of Fan Americanism
may be found in many places. One of the best is in
Howard Trueblood, "Progress of Fan American Cooperation,"
Foreign Folicy Reports, XY (May 15, 1940). In the Bulletin
ot the Pan American Union, LXXIV (~ril, 1940), there is an
aol;-[iscusslon ot the early conferences in which the United
States did not take part.

3

invited to send delegates to the first Congress of Eanama
in 1826, called by Simon Bolivar, President of ieru; the
Senate debated at great length before accepting the invitation, and, when delegates were finally appointed, one
missed the boat and the other died en route.

1

Indeed, ex-

cept for Fresident Monroe's famous message of December 2,
1823, the United States displayed little political interest
in the nations south of the Rio Grande until well after the
Ci vil VJar.

}!'rom 1826 to 1889, this country was not r epre-

sented at any of the numerous political conferences of the
Pan American States.
When the United States finally sought Latin american
cooperation, economic motives lay behind the country's stated
desire to foster peace in the Western Hemisphere.

It was

this pecuniary motivation that "led to the Pan American movement • • • • conceived by James G. Blaine (Secretary of State)
as a diplomatic trade mark for the expansion of the commerce
of the United states."

2

This was in 1881, but, due to poli-

tical dissension within the United States, the First International Conference of American states did not meet until
1889.
lCf. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History
.American Feople (New York: Crofts, 1940), p. 195.
2Samuel Flagg Bemis, ! Diplomatic liistor~
United States (New York: Holt, i936), p. 736.

£t ~

£!

~

4

The thirty-nine years from 1889 to 1928 marked the
period of active imperialism by the United States in Latin
America.

~rimary

motivating factors behind this country's

belligerency in the southern nations -- in the Caribbean
area, specifically -- were economic aggrandizement and a
determination to eliminate any threat to the self-interest
or to the security of the United States.

On one hand,

this aggressiveness was expressed in direct efforts to
foster business and f1.nancial interests; on the other hand,
the policy involved intervention to restore order in revolution-ridden or debt-swamped nations, and to prevent
European interference in Latin American affairs.

It is one

of the ironies of history that the Monroe Doctrine, promulgated to prevent European intervention in the New World,
became an instrument sanctioning such intervention by its
promulgator during this period.
Nothing better illustrates perversion of the Doctrine
than statements of this country's diplomatic leaders:
Secretary of state Richard Olney, on the BritishVenezuelan boundary controversy of 1895:

"Today the United

states is practically sovereign on this continent, and its
fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

1

lQuoted from Foreign Relations, 1895, Olney to Bayard,
July 20, 1895, in Bailey, ~. cIt., p. 483.

And Theodore Roosevelt, in his message to the
Congress of December, 1904:
Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results
in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society
may in America, as elsewhere, ult~ately require intervention by some civilized nation, and, in the Western
Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the
Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however
reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or
impotefce, to the exercise of an international police
power.
Events that marked this imperialistic phase of the
Caribbean policy included the direct challenge to Great
Britain during the Venezuelan controversy of 1895; assumption of a virtual protectorate over Cuba in March, 1901;
taking Panama from Colombia in 1903; extension of nearprotectorate status to Nicaragua after overthrowing the
dictator, Zelaya, in 1914; bombardment of Vera Cruz in 1914;
the punitive expedition against Fancho Villa in 1916; military occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 19151916; dispatch of a battleship to Panama in 1921; sending
of marines and sailors to Nicaragua in 1926.
During this period of four decades, six verbose but
largely meaningless inter-American conferences were held.

2

IJames D. Richardson, Messages ~ Fapers of ~
Presidents (Viashington: Bureau of National Li ters.ture and
Art, 1905), X, 831, quoted in Trueblood, ££. ~., p. 292.
2rn the Special Handbook !££ ~ of the Delegates,
for the Seventh International Conference (BaltImore: ¥an
American Union, 1933), pp. 1-21, there is a brief but complete history of the proceedings and results of the first
six conferences.
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The fact that acute Latin American distrust of the United
States was never absent indicates the actual unimportance
of these meetings.

Nor could the southern nations be cen-

sured for their attitude.

From time to time, however, there

Were some small rifts in the olouds of justifiable suspicion.
Thus the United States gave Latin America profound satisfaction in 1914, when it accepted the mediation of the ABC Fowers
in its dispute with Mexico.

This act, together with the Con-

ference summoned in 1915 by Pre sident Wilson to discuss the
Mexican situation, aroused high hopes in Latin AIlllerica of a
1

new era in Fan American relations.
But, with the close of the World "'ar, there was, if
anything, a promounced growth of "Yankophobia" on the part
of Latin American nations.

With the United States' occupa-

tion of Santo Domingo, financial intervention in Haiti, and
the dispatch of marines to Nicaragua, ill will was almost at
a new high before the Sixth Conference of American States at
Havana in 1928.

~or

did the able defense of American inter-

vention presented by Charles Evans Hughes do more than gloss
over matters at this meeting.

The net effects of the Con-

ference were as much for the bad as for the good.

The fact

that a prominent Argentine delegate lett the meeting after a
verbal tiff with Hughes constituted an unpleasant aftermath.
lOf. "Fan ~ericanism and the Fan American Conferences"
(Foreign PoliQy ~sociation, Information Service, Nov. 27, 192~)
p. 280.
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Definite change in Latin American policy appeared
under the Hoover administration.

Growing criticism at home

and abroad and the difficulty of maintaining property rights
during economic depression undoubtedly contributed to this
change.

The general shift in policy had been foreshadowed

to some extent by the publication in 1930 of a memorandum
on the Monroe Doctrine written by J. Reuben Clark, Undersecretary of State.

1

Although never officially endorsed

by the administration, this work attracted Wide attention
because of its strict construction of the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, repudiating the Roosevelt corollaries as
unjustified by the words of the original statement.

That

the Clark memorandum was an index to future action soon
became apparent.
The usual military intervention did not follow
revolution in Panama in 1931.

No efforts were made to take

over the Dominican Republic or El Salvador when their governments defaulted on debt payments to American nationals.

The

last United States marines in l'iicaragua 'Were withdrawn on
January 2, 1933.
in Haiti.

Steps were taken to end armed intervention

Moreover, this country r everted to i ts traditional

policy of recognition of new governments.

On February 6, 1931,

Secretary of State St,imson repudiated the Vdlsonian policy
lJ. Reuben Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine
(Washington: Government printIng OffTCe:-!930).

8
I.

of non-recognition of governments of revolutionary origin,
and the United States promptly recognized revolutionary
governments in South America, Panama, and the Caribbean
area.

This was an important step; the influence of the

United States has often been so great that the mere granting or withholding of recognition has determined the
existence of governments.

1

Armed intervention by the United States was the
bitterest of all pills for the southern nations to swallow;
no policy could do more for the sake of inter-.American
good will than one of non-intervention.

~t

an early date,

President Roosevelt stated his deterillination not to interfere with the internal affairs of Latin American governments;
on

~ay

16, 1933, he indicated this country's willingness to

forego the practice of armed intervention, except in accordance
with existing treaties. 2 At the Seventh Conference of
iUnerican States held at lvl.ontevideo in 1933, Secretary of
State Hull affirmed the desire of the United States to end
such treaty arrangements with all possible speed, but he
added that "some patience" might be necessary before
lCf. David H. Popper, "Latin American .iolicy of the
Roosevelt Administration," Foreign Policl Reports, X, No. 21
(Dec. 19, 1934), 271.
2Treaty relations of the United States with SOille
Caribbean nations, such as the Permanent Treaty of May, 1903,
with Cuba, and the Canal Agreement of November, 1903, with
Panama, gave Washington the right to intervene under certain
circumstances.

9

"disentanglements from obligations" could be effected. l
During a conference discussion in regard to the
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States a few days
later, Secretary Hull elaborated upon his previous statement~

He said:

Under the Roosevelt administration, the United
States government is as much opposed as any other
government to interference with the freedom, the
sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes
of the governments of other nations • • • • no
government need fear any intervention on the part
of the United States under the Roosevelt administration. 2
The last word on intervention was given by President
Roosevelt two days after the adjournment of the Montevideo
conference.

Roosevelt asserted:

• • • • the definite policy of the United States
from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.
The maintenance of constitutional government in other
nations is not, after all, a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone. The maintenance
of law and the orderly processes of government in this
hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation
within its borders first of all. It is only if and
when the failure of orderly processes affects the
other nations of the continent that it becomes their
concern; and the point to stress is that in such an
event it becomes the joint concern of 3the whole continent in which we are all neighbors.
These statements, at their face value, represented
probably the most abrupt change in foreign policy in the
lMinutes and Antecedents, Seventh International
Conference ot American States, ~ontevideo, 1933, First
Committee, p. 24.
2~., Second Committee, p. 121.

3Franklin Roosevelt,"Address at the Woodrow Wilson
Foundation," December 28, 1933 (~ York Times, December 29,
1933), p. 1.

10
entire history of American foreign relations.

a policy

which had been strongly upheld as late as 1928 by Charles
Evans Hughes was dropped in 1933 by Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Intervention had for years been the cause of the greatest
enmity harbored by Latin American nations against the
United States.

The conference at

~ontevideo

marked the

end of that interventionist policy, at least in theory;
1933 saw a greater cordiality toward the United States on
the part of its southern neighbors than ever before existed.
That non-intervention, in fact, was doubted with
good cause by the Central American republics will be seen
later.

Nevertheless, to some extent, actions backed up

words.

In the spring of 1934, grave disorders in Cuba

sorely tried the new policy.

Although warShips were sent

to Cuban waters, and although the diplomats of this country
indulged in much unbecoming activity, troops were not landed.
The signing of a treaty with Cuba on May 29, 1934, by Which
the Island was released from the interventionist stipuletions
of tbe Platt Amendment, was of significance.

Three months

later, the last marines were withdrawn from Haiti.

Almost

Simultaneously, a pact was signed with Fanama removing some
of the apron strings that had been tied to that country by
the Hay-Buneau-Varilla Treaty of 1903.

1

lThe new treaty was not ratified by the Senate until
July 25, 1939; the delay was caused mostly by OPPOSition by
the army and navy.
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Diffioulties with Mexico gave the Good Neighbor
policy a severe test in 1958 with the Mexican government's
expropriation of foreign oil holdings.

The problem is

still unsettled, but the non-intervention pledge has not
been broken.

Reciprocal trade agreements have been further

indices of Pan American cooperation, and the decision to
give the Philippines their eventual independence has been
still another straw in the wind of diminishing Yanqui
Imperialism.

The first phase of the policy of the United States
toward Central and South America was one of isolation.
Still in the colonial stage of its economic development,
the United States was content to rest almost exclusively
on the stipulations of

~onroe's

doctrine from 1826 to 1889.

As the tempo of economic development in the United States
was accelerated, the demand for Latin American raw materials
and foodstuffs advanced rapidly while, on the other hand,
the Latin American market for products of this country
tended to decrease.

1

Largely as a consequence of this

economic fact, the second and imperialistic phase of Latin
American polioy was instituted.

Marked ohiefly by the

flagrant use of interventionist doctrine, this era is
lTrueblood, ££. ~., p. 287.

12

characterized by an ever increasing hostility toward the
United States on the part of the Central and South American
nations.
Franklin Roosevelt has received a disproportionate
amount of credit for the Good Neighbor, or third, phase of
this country's Latin American policy, which was really inaugurated by Herbert Hoover.

The Good Neighbor policy has

specifically meant the following things:
1.

1

Abandonment of intervention by the United

States, including the complete withdrawal of all this
country's forces from the Caribbean countries.

Non-inter-

vention, however, means different things to different
people, and the United States' interpretation has been
strongly challenged.
2.

2

Refusal of the government to act as a collec-

tion agency for private debts.
3.

Abandonment of the policy of not recognizing

revolutionary governments.
4.

Abrogation of the Platt Amendment in the case

of Cuba, ratification of a new treaty with Panama, withdrawal of financial control from Haiti.
5.

Attempts to improve trade relations on a

reciprocal basis.
lAdapted largely from ~., p. 288 ft.
2Ct. infra, p. 23.
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6.

Fostering of inter-American cultural relations.

7.

Strengthening of the machinery to insure inter-

American peace and

inter-~erican

solidarity against un-

friendly political forces.
The Good Neighbor policy was not instituted for
altruistic reasons; it came into being because .American
profits in Central and South America were drying up during
a period of world-wide depression and because ill will engendered by imperialism was becoming more vocal, more
powerful, and more difficult to keep down.

On the one hand,

the Good Neighbor policy is an attempt to make profit with
honey where vinegar has failed; on the other hand, it is
an attempt to foster good will and continental solidarity
in a period of dynamic and inimical political change.

1

CHAPTER I I

MONTEVIDEO, 1933

CHAPTER II
MONTEVIDEO, 1933
The atmosphere of the Seventh International Conference
of American States, meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, from
December 3 to December 26, 1933, was most unpropitious for
discussion of means to insure peace.

Uppermost in the minds

of all the delegates was the fact that the devastating
Chaco War was still being fought between Bolivia and :Paraguay.
Other purely American considerations making for pessimism
were the current Leticia dispute between Colombia and Feruj
the uncertainties related to the Cuban revolution and
especially the a ttitude of the United States to that leftist
movement; the growing li st of debt d efaul ts; and the imposition of new high tariffs, exchange controls, and quotas
1

that were further decreasing inter-American trade.

Abroad,

the failure of the 't"orld Economic Conference, as well as of
the disarmament negotiations at Geneva, gave further cause
for gloom.
In mitigation of the gloom, the Good N°eighbor policy
was already off to a running start as a result of Hoover's
administration and Roosevelt's inaugural statement.

At

MonteVideo, Hull's approving stand on non-intervention was
lCf. Charles A. Thomson, "The Seventh :ian .american
Conference, ~ntevideo," Foreign $011c1 Reports, X, No. ?
(dune 6, 1934), 90.
~

15
not the only fundamental shift in United States policy.
At previous conferences, the United States had refused to
discuss such controversial questions as private debts and
tariff policies; here, however, the reverse ws.s true.

In-

deed, Hull's leadership was most marked in the discussion
of economic measures; his program resulted in a resolution
to promote trade, reduce tariffs, liberalize commercial
policies, foster the most-favored-nation principle, and
favor the establishment of a permanent agency to aid in
the reduction of trade barriers.

1

Hull also put the United States on record as being
willing to sign, ratify, and keep all the peace pacts that
had been promulgated previously by the American states.

2

These included:
1.

The Gondra Treaty for Avoiding and rreventing

Conflicts, signed at the Fifth Conference at Santiago in
1923.

The characteristic feature of this convention was

the establishment of a procedure of investigation in the
case of a conflict, the idea being borrowed from the Bryan
lFinal Act, Resolution V, p. 6. All Final Acts
cited are printea-in The International Conferences of
American states, FirstlSupplement, 1933-1940 (Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1940). At
Montevideo, Resolutions LXXX and LXXXI also dealt with
the desirability of fostering better inter-American trade
relations. Cf. also Hull's address introducing Resolution
V, Dec. 12, 1933, in Report £! ~ Delegates of ~ United
States to the Seventh International Conference (Washington,
1934), pp.-rI3 ft. On p. 5 of thIs report, Hull's complete
plan for economic cooperation introduced at ~ontevideo is
outlined.
~inutes ~ Antecedents, Committee I, pp. 23-25.
A good review of the peace machinery of the American nations
is found in Alfaro, ~. cit., pp. 44 ff.

16
~cooling

off" treaties of 1913 and 1914.

The Gondra

Convention excepted some controversies, gave limited
powers to the permanent commissions, and provided no
conciliation until commissions of inquiry were formed.
At the time of

~ontevideo,

this treaty had not been

ratified by Argentina and Bolivia.
2.

The General Treaty of Inter-American Con-

oiliation, signed at Washington in 1929.

This treaty

aimed at remedying defects of the Gondra Convention by
extending conciliation to "all controversies of any kind
whioh have arisen or may arise."

Here, too the Com-

mission of Inquiry, itself, was allowed to render conciliation.

The treaty had not been ratified by Argentina,

Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, lionduras, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, or Venezuela.
3.

The General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitra-

tion and the Additional Frotocol of Frogressive Arbitration,
also Signed at Washington in 1929.

Arbitration by these

pacts was extended to disputes of a legal character only,
which could not have been settled through diplomatic channels.
These measures had not been ratified by Argentina, Bolivia,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Faraguay, peru, the United
States, or Uruguay.
4.
~nd

The Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Fact of Non-Aggression

Conciliation, signed at Rio de Janeiro on October 10,

1933.

This treaty provided that the parties "condemn wars

17
of aggression"; agree that disputes of all kinds be settled
"only by pacific means"; and obligate themselves "to submit
disputes to the conciliation procedure," with certain exceptions.

The conciliation procedure established in this

treaty differs in some respects from that in the Convention
of 1929.

In both cases, however, the parties to a dispute

are not bound by the findings of the Commission.

This new

treaty, entirely unratified at the time of Montevideo, had
only been signed by

~gentina,

Brazil, Ohile, Mexico, Para-

1

guay and Uruguay.
Complicated by overlapping and sometimes conflicting
clauses, these pacts were made ineffective by the lack of
signatures and ratifications.

One of the first acts of the

Montevideo Oonference, initiated by Argentina and Ohile and
supported by the United States, was to pass unanimously a
resolution urging the ratification of these instruments.

2

In the resolution, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty was also named.

3

As a result of the resolution, a proces-verbal was signed
before the end of the Conference; all the American governments signified their intention to ratify the conventions

~

lLists of signatures and ratifications from Report
Delegates, p. 8.

2!

2Final~, Resolution IV, p. 6.

3Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay
had not ratified the Briand-Kellogg pact at the time of the
Montevideo meeting.
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1

and pacts in the manner prescribed by each.
Such a pious promise is a good example of Pan American
peace machinery at its worst.

In January, 1941, despite this

resolution and one similar to it passed at Buenos aires three
years later, virtually none of these treaties had been rati2

fied by the requisite number of signatory states.
tina is perhaps the worst offender.

Jirgen~

To date (June, 1941),

she has ratified only her own Saavedra Lamas Pact:
After passing resolutions to hurry the ratification
of a multiplicity of peace treaties, the Conference delegates
proceeded to add more conventions to the already long list.
Main result of their efforts was the Additional Frotocol to
the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation.

This

protocol was the outcome of an effort by a committee of the
American Institute of International Law to create a permanent
International Commission of Conciliation of fifteen members
to take the place of the two commissions previously established
under the Gondra Treaty of 1923 and the Conciliation Convention
of 1929.

"The Conference doubted the practicability of this

project and decided in favor of improving and simplifying
3

existing machinery.".

"Simplification" took the form of

lproces-verbal of the intention to subscribe to the
pacts for the settlement of international conflicts by
pacific means, text from the certified copy in the archives
of the Pan American Union, in the International Conference
af American states, first supplement (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1940), p. 124.
2

See chart, 1'oldeg.,_ p. 102.

3Report £! 1a! Delegates, p. 10. For the discussion
on the Protocol, cf. Minutes ~ Antecedents, Committee I,
pp. 56-61, 71, 87.
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providing that the two commissions set up by the earlier
pacts would be formulated as permanent bodies so as to be
ready to act immediately when controversies arose; formerly,
the commissions would be formed only after disputes had
1

taken place.
The Conference made other attempts at oiling up the
creaking peace machine.

A resolution on Good Offices and

Mediation, introduced by the American delegate, J. Reuben
Clark, was unanimously adopted.

It provided that "it shall

never be deemed an unfriendly act for any State • • • • to
offer good offices or mediation to other States engaged in
a controversy," and was intended to supply a means for good
offices only in those cases in which there was no other
2

machinery to function.
It has been noted that "the question of the Chaco
and the reestablishment of the peace of the continent was
:3

uppermost in the minds of all the delegates."

Despi te

the fact that the agenda carried no item on the Chaco, a
good part of the time of the First Oommittee on the Organization of Peace was spent in discussing the Bolivia-Paraguay
IText of protocol from certified copy in the archives
of the Fan American Union is printed in ~ Conferences of
American States, p. 20.
2Final

!£!,

Resolution XXXVI, p. 22.

:3 W• Mayer, "Seventh International Conference of American
States; Review of the Tangible Results," Bulletin of the ~an
American Union, LXVIII U..pril, 1934), 2'72.
- -
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1

war and ways and means to end it.

In the discussions,

secretary of State Hull emphasized the fact that every
effort should be made to bring pressure to bear upon the
two countries to end their difficulties, especially in view
of the fact that the Conference was placing such great stress
on peace machinery.

Eloquent remarks on the desirability of

peace were made by delegates of almost every country.
The United states, whose opposition to such things
had been prominent at former conventions, again broke precedent
at Montevideo when Hull urged the utmost cooperation for the
solution of the Chaco problem with the League of Nations Commission which was on the scene.

A sub-committee, formed to

discuss peace in the Chaco, devoted its labors almost exclusively to assisting the Commission.

On December 15, at

the same session of Committee I in which the resolution on
the ratification of peace treaties was approved, telegrams
were read from the presidents of eight countries, including
the United States, urging the Conference to do everything
2

possible to promote an amicable solution of the Chaco dispute.
The efforts of the League Commission and the sub-committee resulted in the Signing of an armistice by Bolivia and
Paraguay on December 19, 1933.

Announcement of the truce at

the Conference called forth the most enthusiastic tribute.
IThe question reappears frequently through the Minutes
and Antecedents, especially of Committee I, pp. 7-65.
2~., pp. 27-28.
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The Conference adopted a resolution on December 24,
in which it extended greetings to the League of Nations Commission and reaffirmed its faith in pacific means for the
1

settlement of international disputes.

At the same session,

the Conference unanimously adopted a resolution, proposed
by Secretary Hull, calling the attention of Bolivia and
Paraguay to their obligations under the Covenant of the
League of Nations for the submission of their dispute to a
pacific settlement and requesting the disputants to "accept
juridical methods for the solution of the dispute, as con2

sistently recommended • • • • "
Settlement of the Chaco dispute was regarded by
Conference delegates as one of the high points of their
achievements.
however.

Many self-congratulatory words were wasted,

Before the ink was even dry on the resolution,

the disputing nations were accusing each other of breaking
the terms of the truce; and before the first of the year,
3

the war was under way in full force again.
lFinal Act, Resolution LXII, p. 28. This resolution
also extended a-VOte of applause to Dr. Gabriel Terra, Fresident of Uruguay, for his previous intervention in the Chaco.
2Final

~, Resolution XCV, p. 34.

3Many commentators put blame on Argentine for instigating the Chaco War, for prolonging it, and for the
combatants' failure to keep the truce. Cf. Carleton Beals,
The comini Struggle for Latin America (New York: Halcyon
House, 19 0), pp. 339=!42. argentina's inSincerity seems
well proved; yet Argentina led in paying lip service to
Chaco peace at fuontevideo. For comment on situation at
Montevideo, cf. Charles A. Thompson, ~. ~.J p. 92.
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The most important single ect of the Oonference in
the actual cementing of

inter-~erican

solidarity was the
1

Oonvention passed on the Rights and Duties of States.
Article VIII of this treaty declares that "no state has the
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of
another."

During the discussion of this article, Secretary

Hull made the statement previously noted in regard to the
approval of the doctrine of non-intervention by the United
2
States.
His stand was heartily praised in the extravagant
terms that only Oentral American diplomats still

se~

to com-

mand in the days of declining Fourth-of-July oratory.
Other significant pledges made in the Oonvention include the following:

(l}"The primary interest of states is

the conservation of peace.

Differences of any nature • • • •
3

should be settled by recognized pacific methods";

(2)"The

contracting states definitely establish as a rule of their
conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial
acquisitions or

~ecial

advantages Which have been attained

by force • • • • the territory of a state is inviolable and
may not be the object of military occupation nor of other
measures of force by another state, directly or indirectly,
lText from certified copy in the archives of the Pan
American Union in The International Oonferences of American
States, pp. l20-l2~
2

Supra, p. 9.
3Ar ticle 10.

.,
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1
or for any motive whatever, even temporarily. It

It is

significant that the cautious l'tIlr. Hull signed this treaty
with a reservation, because within the period of the Conference there was "apparently not time • • • • to prepare
interpretations and definitions of fundamental terms that
2

are embraced in the report."
Although the entire tenor of the

~ontevideo

Con-

ference was one of amicability and cordially-expressed relationships, standing very strongly in contrast to the
rancor of the Havana meeting five years before, the United
States did not escape without one challenge to its stated
good intentions.

A statement by a Colombian delegate

praiSing the United States for not intervening inthe recent
Cuban revolution was challenged strongly by Angel Alberto
Giraudy, President of Cuba's delegation.

Senor Giraudy

stated:
It is not possible to remain silent when it is affirmed that the United States does not wish to intervene
in Cub~, because this is not true. If intervention
means • • • • the actual occupation of a country, the
subjugation of peoples, then the statement is correct.
But if it is not intervention when in a defenseless
nation a representative of the United States incites
lArticle 11.
2Brazil and Peru also signed with reservations, stating that they accepted the prinCiple stated in Article 11
but "do not oonsider it oodifiable because there are same
countries that have not yet signed the Anti-War Pact of
Rio de Janeiro of which this doctrine is a part • • • • It
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part of the people against the government • • • • ;
if it is not intervention to surround a defenseless
island by a threatening fleet in an attempt to impose upon it a government it does not desire; then
there has never been any intervention in America."2

1

This statement was greeted by no applause, as far as the
record shows, but there is no doubt that the Cuban delegate
was expressing a thought held in common by many present.
Throughout the Conference, the

~exican

3

delegates,

who represented one of the few actual working democracies
in the hemisphere, found themselves leading in the introduction of measures on which no action was taken.

An

elaborate peace code, designed to coordinate in one document all the features of the various peace treaties, was
presented.

The only objections expressed to it were on the

grounds of its all-inclusiveness.
step forward.

It was too big.a single

The Conference, "bearing in mind the advan-

tages which could be offered by the concentration" resolved
that the project should be submitted to the consideration
4
of the governments belonging to the Fan American Union.
lA reference to the activities of Undersecretary
Sumner Welles who actively opposed the liberal government
of Grau San Martin in favor of more conservative regimes.
Cf. Beals, ~. ~., pp. 226-230.

2~inutes ~ Antecedents, p. 34.
3The efforts of the United States were, in great
measure, responsible for the defection of the Grau San ~artin
government and the final stability of the military dictatorship of General Fulgencio Batista. Cf. infra, p. 105.
4F1nal Act, Resolution XXXV, p. 16.
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A good example of how such excellently conceived projects can
be lost in the labyrinth of Pan American relations is afforded
by the

~exican

Peace Code.

It was submitted in amended form

to the Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance of peace
in 1936, which, in turn, submitted it to the Oommittee of
Experts for the Codification of International Law, \0 be reI

ported upon at the Eighth Conferenoe at Lima in 1938.

The

Eighth Conference again passed the buok back to the Oommittee
of Experts and asked that it be broaohed at the Ninth Con2

ference in 1942:

Though many diplomats have paid verbal

homage to this code, its chances of passage seem just as
slim for 1942 as they were in 1933.
The Mexican delegate, Puig Oasauranc, also expressed
an eloquent desire to have the problem of debts, bimetallism,
a continental centrel bank, and other important economio
problems discussed at the Oonference.

3

The United

3t~tes

and

Argentina opposed discussing these problems on the ground that
the Oonference was not prepared to deal with such subjects.
The project was lost in the maze of the organization and was
4
finally referred to a Pan American finanoial conference.

p. 16.

IFinal~, Buenos Aires Oonference, Resolution XXVIII,
2Final ~, Eighth Conferenoe, Resolution XV, p. 38.
3Reports ~ ~ Delegates, p. 26.
4Final ~, Resolution I, p. 5.

Of. infra, p. 94.
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In evaluating the influence of any of the Conferences
of American States, one is impressed, first, with the amazing
amount of verbiage and the plethora of relatively unimportant
resolutions that, at

~ontevideo,

ranged from the campaign

against the locusts to the problem of lending dignity to
labor.

These matters clutter up the record and the delegates'

time; at the Seventh Conference, for example, the United States
found itself in a minority of one arguing against a convention
on the nationality of women and spending considerable effort
in upholding its position.

The problem is to extract the im-

portant factors from the limbo of well-meaning platitudes.
There is no doubt that at Montevideo the conditional
acceptance by the United States of the principle of non-intervention was the foremost achievement of the Conference.

With-

out such a stand, there could have been no hope of ever achieving unity among the Americas.

With the stand, a degree of

unity became possible; but it cannot be said that the Seventh
Conference capitalized on the opportunity.
The political agreements arrived at, such as the procesverbal of the intention to subscribe to the pacts for the
pacific settlement of international conflicts, were of the
first degree of unimportance.

If a nation has the intention

of ratifying peace pacts, this adherence will follow in the
normal course of that nation's foreign policy.

If, however,
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a nation's foreign policy does not include the adherence to
such pacts, no additional agreements promising to adhere
will have any effect whatsoever.

There is no better case
1

in point than the policy of Argentina.
The high-sounding resolutions and conventions, given
so much attention by the Conference prove, on critical examination, little more than words, words, words; proposals with
teeth in them, such as the Mexican Feace Code, were passed
over entirely by the

Conferenc.~.

The economic aChievements of the Seventh Conference
lay also in the realm of potentialities rather than actualities,
as far as the promotion of inter-American solidarity was concerned.

Secretary Hull's program for reciprocal trade

ments and for the scaling
widespread approval.

do~n

ag~ee-

of tariff barriers received

The agreements reached, however, were

in the form of non-obligatory resolutions.

And the important

proposals of Mexico were passed over completely.

In a like

fashion, the codification of international law received marked
impetus at

~ontevideoJ

but could achieve significance only

through the willingness of the states concerned to adhere to
2
the legal system being finely fashioned.
From another aspect, the very fact that the twenty-one
1

Supra, p. 18.

2Final Act, Resolution LXX, p. 28 proposed improved
methods for the-;Qdification of international law.
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American states were

~illing

to send delegates to discuss

openly important political, economic, and juridical

~uestions

was a significant phenomenon in a world which, even then, was
turning away from the conference table to the battlefield.
~d

it is in the intangible area of fostering favorable public

opinion that perhaps the greatest achievements of
rest.

~ontevideo

Intangible, but marked, too, was the general feeling

of cordiality among the delegates; yet the same sense of wellbeing might have been gained
at a

ban~uet

ade~uately

and less hypocritically

table rather than at a conference table.

Atter-

dinner speeches are not taken so seriously as peace pledges.
The Seventh Conference was jarred from its own selfesteem by (1) accusations in the back rooms that Argentina
was actively aiding Paraguay carryon hostilities against
Bolivia, while. at the same time, professing to be in strong1

est sympathy with the peace movement;
criticism

fro~

and (2) outspoken

CUba of the current interpretation of non-

intervention by the United States.
Secretary Hull. in usual diplomatic fashion, confused
the expressed intent with the actuality when he stated the
results of the Conference in the following fashion:
A great new epoch in our relations has been born.
A mighty new era of permanent friendliness, understanding,
economic peace and cultural cooperation, and all-~erican
solidarity has been inaugurated. We have outlawed war ~d
con~uest and embarked upon our peaceful destiny • • • •
lOft supra, note 3, p. 21.
~uoted

2Cordell Hull, Speech at Lima, Peru, January 11, 1934,
in the Report of the Delegates, p. 69.
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CHAPTER III
BUENOS AIRES, 1936
The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance
of peace met at the suggestion of President Roosevelt at
Buenos Aires, Argentina, from December 1 to December 23,
In identical notes, addressed to the heads of the

1936.

American republics, Roosevelt called attention to the fact
that the peace protocol recently negotiated between Bolivia
and paraguay offered "an altogether favorable opportunity"
for the American states "to consider their joint responsibility and their common need of rendering less likely in
the future the outbreak or the continuation of hostilities

• • • • and by so do ing, serve in an eminently practical
manner the cause of permanent peace on this Western Conti1

nent."
Although the European situation found no pla.ce in
the official story of Buenos Aires, the effect of the
European backdrop on the American stage cannot be gainsaid.
The League of Nations had further demonstrated its inefficacy
by failing to do anything about either the Italian conquest
lCircular letter from the President of the United
States to the Presidents of the other American Republics
proposing the convocation of the Conference, Inter-American
Conference for the Maintenance of Peace • • • • Special
Handbook for the Use of Delegates (Washington: The Pan
American Union;-19~)-:-pp. 1-3.
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of Ethiopia, oonsummated in the previous summer; or the oivil
war in Spain, still raging after more than a year and a half;
or the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, aooomplished
in the previous Maroh.

These

~~re

further indioations that the

deoline of the Versailles Peaoe and the League of Nations was
oontinuing at full paoe.

Europe's peaoe had already been

broken and there seemed no possibility of mending it.

Amerioa's

war had just ended and the time seemed ripe to take steps insuring oontinuation of the peaoe.
The purpose of the Conferenoe, as outlined in the
President's invitation, was to determine how the maintenanoe
of peaoe might best be safeguarded --

~hether,

perhaps,

through the prompt ratifioation of all the Amerioan peaoe
instruments, already negotiated; whether through the amendment of existing peaoe instruments • • • • ; or perhaps through
the oreation by oommon aooord of new instruments of peaoe addi tional to those already formulated."
The twenty-one Amerioan states unanimously approved
President Roosevelt's suggestions; the Conferenoe met on
sohedule, and, although the original intention was to oonfine
it to problems of peaoe, the program was ultimately extended
to oover almost the soope of the preceding Montevideo meeting.
Of the sixty-four resolutions and tVi"elve oonventions, the
four most important to inter-Amerioan solidarity were:
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1.

The Convention for the Maintenanoe, Preservation,

and Reestablishment of Peaoe.

(Known as the Consultative

Pact.)
2.

The Additional protocol Relative to Non-Inter-

3.

The Declaration of Prinoiples of Inter-American

vention.

Solidarity and Cooperation.
4.

The Convention to Coordinate, Extend, and

~sure

the Fulfillment of the Existing Feace Treaties between American States.
Terms of the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace were an adaptation of a
projeot submitted by Brazil which, using the language of the
original message of President

~onroe

in 1823, stated that

the oontracting powers "would consider as an unfriendly act
the interference of any extra-continental power with an
Amerioan country, whenever suoh interference should threaten
the security of that country or else directly or indirectly
endanger its territorial integrity or determine the exercise,
in any form, of a preponderant influence in its destiny. tt
Thus, the Brazilian proposal sought to make the

~onroe

1

Doctrine

the common doctrine of all the American states.
'l'his direct challenge to Europe, however, encountered
opposition from 4rgentina, especially.

ConseQuently, the

IDiario "T'"':"'de la Conferencia, p. 500, quoted in Ricardo
J. iufaro, 2£.. ~., p. 95.
.
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pro j ect Vias revised; as finally accepted, it referred in
vague terms to the situation arising "in the event that the
peace of the American republics was menaced," and it called
in such event f or mutual consultation by the American stCites,
"for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful
cooperation. tt
Article II of the Convention goes beyond the scope
of the

~onroe

Doctrine.

It deals with two distinct situations;

one arising in the event of

9.

Yoar between .American states, the

other in the event of "an international war outside .a::nerica."
Provision is made for consultation among the
ments in both cases.

~erican

govern-

In the former, consultation has as its

object, "a method of peaceful collaboration.tI

In the more

important case of a war outside America, language of the treaty
reached its high point of saying nothing; consultation is to
take place "to detennine the proper time and manner in Which
the signatory states, if they so desire, may eventually cooperate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the
1

American continent."
It is somewhat ironical that Argentina, and not the
United States, retarded the scrapping of the unilateral Monroe
Doctrine; this country was willing to go the entire distance
in setting up mutual guarantees of collective security in
IText from certified copy in the Archives of the
Department of State; printed in The International Conferences
of American States, p. 188. EcuadOr and Honduras Signed wIth
mrnor reservatIons.
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in the hemisphere.

Argentina was loath to slap at her good

customer, Germany.

The southern republic desired, of course,

to retain the relinquishment of the United States' right of
solo action; at the same time, she did not want to clasp
hands too tightly with the United States and thus prevent
her from reaching out to Europe.
To call the result a convention of "very guarded
language" is to pay it too high a compliment.

1

It is a con-

venti on whose language allows the signatories almost precisely
the freedom of action they had before it existed.

The in-

nocuous brand of consultation provided, in the case of an
extra-continental threat, is softened further by "if they
so desire"; lack of any machinery of consultation is further
evidence of lack of real intent to take effective unified
action.

For the sake of unanimity, the convention had all

its teeth drawn.
The most important effect of this treaty was probably
a psychological one.

Though "cont inentallzing tf the .1W.onroe

Doctrine was not accomplished in fact, the support of the
United States was bound to cement more friendly relations
with the southern republics in this new manifestation of
the Good Neighbor policy.

yet from the viewpoint of the

United States, the result was no cause for self-congratulation;
the country gave up a policy of long standing in exchange for
a mess of words signifying nothing.
lCf. Charles G. Fenwick, "The Buenos Aires Conference:
1936," Foreign Policy RePorts, XIII, l~o. 8 (July 1, 1937)
p. 92. Professor Fenwick's review is able, albeit over-o;timistic.
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The assoaiation of the Additional
to Non-Intervention with the Oonsultative
means accidental.

If the latter ever

~rotocol

was by no

~act

~orked,

Relative

its machinery

of consultation would make domination on the part of the
leading state of the continent easily possible.

The

Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of states
had laid down the prinCiple that "no state has the right
to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."
The Additional Protocol, for no discernible reason except
to allay fears of the South and Central American states, reaffirmed this prinCiple, declaring "inadmissible" the intervention of anyone of the contracting parties "directly or
indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any of the other parties."

It also pro-

vided that "the violation of the provisions • • • • shall
give rise to mutual consultation, with the object of exchanging views and seeking methods of peaceful adjustment ...

2

Like the Additional protocol, the Declaration of
Inter-American Solidarity, presented by the combined Central
American delegations, contained little or nothing new in the
field of inter-American peace machinery.

A preamble recited

the existence of common ideals of peace and justice and the
1 Cf. supra, p. 22.

2Text from certified copy in the Department of State;
printed in International Conf~rences of American States,
PP. 191-192.
--

1
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necessity of making a declaration of "principles of American
int~rnational

law, by which is understood a moral union of

all the American republics • • • • " and "the principle of
American solidarity in all non-continental American conflicts."

I

The declaration then asserted the "absolute

juridical liberty" of the American nations and "their unrestricted respect f or their respective sovereignties" and the
"existence of a common democracy throughout ..cWerica"; it
enumerates as prinCiples accepted by the .iwlerican community
of nations:
(a) proscription of territorial conquests and that,
in consequence, no acquisition made through violence
shall be recognized; (b) intervention by one state in
the internal or external affairs of another state is
condemned; (c) forcible collection of pecuniary debts
is illegal; and (d) any difference or dispute between
the American nations • • • • shall be settled by the
methods of conciliation, or unrestricted arbitration,
or through operations of international justice.
Again one is left overwhelmed with the words but unimpressed with the effect.

~ain,

too, the only teeth of

the original document were extracted by the Argentine delegates.
This was a statement to the effect that "all the American
nations will consider as an attack upon themselves individually
an attack which may be made by any nation upon the rights of
another • • • •

,,2

lFinal~, Resolution XXVII, p. 16.
2Diario de la Conferencia, p. 493, quoted in FenWick,

.2£0 cit., p. 94.--
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Argentine oonservatism also won at the expense of the
program of the United states in the drafting of the Convention
1

on Treaty Coordination and Neutrality.

In the original draft

prepared by t.he delegation of the United states,provision
had been made for the creation of a "permanent
conSUltative committee."

inter-~erican

Determined OPPOSition from the

Argentine delegation to the creation of this committee was
partly on the ground that it suggested a politioal organization of the oontinent contrary to the policy consistently
followed with regard to the Pan American Union, and partly
on the ground that it appeared to be an attempt to set up a
sort of League of American Nations in opposition to the League
2

at Geneva.

Although neither objeotion seemed particularly

germane, the United States dropped the proposal purely for
the sake of harmony.

In the place of the permanent committee

Was substituted the bare obligation to consult, without reference
to any machinery of conSUltation.

The Convention, as finally

passed, rep eated the Montevideo attempt to coordinate and make
more effective the five previously signed peace conventions
:3

for the continent;

set forth, in case peace failed, the

IThe ~ontevideo Resolution
At the time of the Conferenoe only
States, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican
and Salvador) had ratified all the
treaties.
2Cf • Fenwick, ~.

£il.,

had been largely ignored.
seven countries (The United
Republic, ~exico, Nicaragua,
important American peace

p. ~5.

3Articles I and II', Text of the oonvention from oerti~
fied copy in the Department of State; printed in International
Oonferences ~ American States, pp. 1~2~1~7. Argentina, Faraguay, El Salvador, Colombia signed the convention with reservations. A resolution, No. III, was also passed relative to
ratification of peace treaties.
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desirability on the part of the contraoting states, of adopting,
"in their character as neutrals a common and solid attitude, in
order to discourage or prevent the spread or prolongation of
1

hostilities";

and described criteria f or determining when

hostilities became war and when neutrality proposals would
2

come into effect.
The treaty again demonstrated praiseworthy, verbal intentions of the American states; aside from this, however, it
was moribund from birth as the re sult of innumerl;ible exceptions
possible under its terms, intentionally vague language, and
complicated, ill-defined overlapping with previous treaties.
That these four measures, with all their weaknesses,
were the outstanding steps taken towards

~an

American solidarity

at the Buenos Aires Conference demonstrates the mediocre accomplishments of that meeting.

Yet an analysis of the final

act reveals very little else of any consequence whatever.

The

resolution on the lLnitation of armaments was a case in
3

point.

In all the annals of all international conferences,

there is probably no more pious, more contradictory, and more
lArticle VII. No obligation existed Where the neutrality
measures ceme into conflict with previously signed pacts; thus,
for the sixteen of the twenty-one states who were members of the
League of Nations, the neutrality terms of the treaty were
largely nullified.
2Article V. The original proposal of the United States
provided for an arms embargo, the prohibition of loans and the
restriction of trade to all belligerent states; this was in acoordance with the existing neutrality legislation of the United
States. The proposal met with unqualified disapproval of all
the other states and was therefore dropped.
3Final ~, Resolution XXXIII, p. 18.
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meaningless act.

With any possibility of a system of collective

security ruled out by the convention conservatives, the best
that could be done was to recommend that all governments "which
consider themselves in a position to do so" conclude agreements
for limiting "their armaments to the greatest possible extent,
within the requirements of internal order, and the justified
defense of their sovereignty:"
Attacking the evils of militarism fram another angle,
the Conference went on record formally repudiating war as a
means of settling differences between states and recommending
1

the "humanization ot war" where and when it occurred.

A

project on the definition of an aggressor, presented by Bolivia
and Brazil, was altogether too controversial to handle; it was
referred to the Committee of Experts in charge of the codifica2
tion of law.
Additional treaties Signed on (1) the Frevention
of Controversies and (2) Good Offices and
little or no consequence.

3

~ediation

were of

As a matter of fact, they probably

weakened the structure of pan American peace machinery by
establishing overlapping means of settlement, less binding
than others previously provided.
lFinal

!£!,

Resolution XXXIV.

2~., Resolution XXX, p. 17.

3The former established permanent bi-lateral commissions
to study, with the object of eliminating, causes for future controversies and to propose additional lawful measures; the latter
provided that when controversies arise that cannot be settled by
diplomatiC means, the disputant nations have recourse to the
mediation of "an eminent citizen" of any of the other American
countries. Texts from certified copies in the Department of
State, in ~ International Conferences ~ American States,
pp. 197-201.
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It oannot be said that the eoonomio steps taken were
any more impressive.

The Montevideo Conferenoe had adopted

a resolution whioh was both a declaration of prinoiples and
a program of "eoonomio disarmament. ff

There was little left

to do, unless the Conferenoe was willing to take specifio
and definite steps.

The Conferenoe wasn't willing; it there-

fore merely repeated reoommendations for the prinoiple of
1

abolishing or reduoing trade restrictions in general,

and

for the somewhat contradictory prinoiple of equality of treat2

ment in respect to whatever restriotions might be maintained.
Both resolutions carried the inevitable qualification that the
polioies were to be put into effect to the extent to whioh
"the different national economies" permitted.
The most definite results of the Feace Conference,
strangely enough, were in the field of cultural and intellectual oooperation and "moral disarmament. tI

Twenty-three of the

sixty-two resolutions adopted dealt with these topics; one of
the most significant measures was the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Oultural Relations, which provided
for an annual exchange of students and professors between each
3

of the Pan Amerioan states.

The Conferenoe referred to the

IFinal ~, Resolution XLVI, p. 23.
2Final ~, Resolution XLIV, p. 22.
3Text from oertified oo;;y in the Department of State,
printed in The International Conferenoes of ~erican States,
Pl'. 203-205:--
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next meeting the proposal for a permanent Inter-american Court,
which had been backed by Oosta Rica, Salvador, Guatemala, and
1

Nicaragua.
Throughout the Oonference, more so than at any previous
one, the nations of the two americas were clearly divided in
their viewpoints.

Argentina, supported by Ohile and Uruguay,

represented the conservative European opinion.

These countries

stood in favor of universalism, leaguismj stood opposed to
any strong regional understandings, to expreSSions of continental solidarity, to an American League of Nations, to the
Tf

continentalizing" of the Jltionroe Doctrine, and to a permanent

Inter-American Court.

The Dominican Republic and Oolombia

represented the opposite extreme, with recommendations for
2

full-fledged American Leagues of Nations;

Mexico and Venezuela,

urging a unified peace code, stood close to the left with the
five Central American nations in a bloc of partial support;
the latter were successful in their advocacy of the resolution
of continental solidarity.

The United states, Brazil, and

Cuba were the centrists of the Conference, being pulled too
far toward the right extreme for the fulfillment of their re1

~.,

.

Resolution IV, p. 7.

2Ibid., Resolution X, p. 9 took cognizance of the two
projects,-aeclaring that complicating factors made the topic
"not sufficiently ripe," and recommending that the two states
reconcile the differences in their respective drafts; it resolved to include the project on the agenda of the Eighth
Oonference at Lima. Bolivia, Cuba, and Ecuador, in addition
to the Dominic~ Republic and Bolivia, urged that the union
be discussed.
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spective programs but suffering the compromise for the sake
1

of Conference unanimity.
On one point the United states did not compromise.
This was the resolution on the coordination of the pacific
instruments with the Covenant of the League of Nations; this
measure recommended that the American states which were members
of the League and signatories of the Pact of Paris, the Saavedra
Laamas Treaty and "any such agreements signed in the future"
should request of states that were not melDbers of the League
but were parties to the other treaties that they cooperate with
the League.

This cooperation would take the form of studying

projects for the coordination of these instruments with the
Covenant and with measures that Geneva might adopt to prevent
war or to settle disputes by pacific means.

Despite broad

qualifications allowed in the resolution, the delegates of
the United states abstained from voting f or the measure which
would have pledged their country to cooperate with the League.
It is worth noting that the Argentine delegates, who urged this
resolution, were not willing to drop it as the re,Presentatives
of the United states had dropped projects when unanimity was
not possible.

Passage of the resolution was a clear victory

for Argentina over the United States, for the adherents of
universal action over the supporters of hemispheric action.
Another resolution solidified the victory; it provided that
IPaul Vanorden Shaw, "Buenos Aires," reprinted from
Ngrth American Review (March, .1957), pp. 24~41, in ~ Reference
S elf, XII, Ne. 6 (1958), p. 153.
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"treaties and conventions adopted at Inter-American Conferences
shall be open to accession or adherence of the &nerican states
which may not have signed them • • • • (the same) shall be open
to all states whenever it is so provided in such instruments."
To this the United States acceded.

Virtually every step taken forward at Buenos Aires
was accompanied by a qualification somewhat negating the total
gains.

Thus, the Monroe Doctrine was tacitly amplified into

a multi-lateral agreement by the Consultative Fact; but any
genuine advance in inter-American unity that might have been
achieved through such an a greemen twas e ffecti vely emasculated
by the substitution of the vague Argentinian wording for the
clearcut statement presented by Brazil.

Thus, the prinCiple

of conSUltation was established in any contingenoy; but the
permanent consultative committee had to be 'dropped; and only
a pious resolve was substituted for it.
Nevertheless, it must be said that insofar as legal
obligations and expressions of idealistic objectives are concerned, the Conference was unqualifiedly successful.

.trin-

oiples of equality of states and of non-intervention received
new confirmation; repudiation of war and territorial conquest,
although along familiar lines, can scarcely be criticized for
repetition; the economic resolutions can only be lauded for
1

Final~,

Resolution V, p. 2.

1
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the lip service they paid to the principle of free trade.
Furthermore, mobilization of public opinion on behalf of
pacific settlement caused by the Convention itself and provided for, indirectly, through the Consultative Convention
1

was a genuine and valuable factor.
Yet what might have been done impresses one more
strongly than what actually was accomplished.

The treaties

of Buenos Aires, with those preceding them, created no definite
system or procedure of consultation.

In case of a conflict,

there were many overlapping jurisdictions, providing possibilities of delay and duplication of efforts.

Frocedures

were ill defined, and there were so many different courses
to follow that chances for successful peaceful settlement
were slim indeed.

The need for careful coordination of the

agreements and unification of the procedures could have been
met by the adoption of a single document, such as the lJexican
I'eace Oode J or the adoption of separate J but harmonious Con2

ventions, which together could form one structure.

Instead,

Buenos Aires added willy-nilly to the numerous conventions
existing and postponed consideration of the Mexican proposal.
lCf. Re!ort of the Delegates of the United ~tates of
.America to the 'nter:::im:ertcan Conference"fOr the ~aintenanCi
of Paace\Washington: United States Goverruneii't"frinting Office,
193?), p. ?
9

....Samuel Guy Inman, Building an Inter-.american l~eighbor
hood, "World Affairs Books," ~o. 20 (New York: National Feace
c:onrerence, 193?), p. 50.
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A fundamental reason for the lack of success at all
the conferences of the glibly labeled "AiJlerican dem.ocracies"
was well demonstrated at Buenos Aires.

The countries meet-

ing there, in the first place, were not democracies; they
were engaged in heated economic rivalries; they were split
fundamentally on the problem of

~ericanism

salism; they were, in large part, closer to

versus univer~urope

than to

~res,

only the

each other, culturally and ethnically.
Of the states represented at Buenos

United States, kexico, Costa Rica, ranama, and Colombia were
not at least benevolent dictatorships.

Fresident Roosevelt,

who addressed the Conference, asserted that "Democracy is
1

still the hope of the world."

Yet, in seventeen or eighteen

of the nations represented, constitutional representative
government was honored habitually in the breach, executives
normally overrode the legislative and judicial arms of the
government, and electoral machinery was rendered more or
less meaningless by coercion or fraud.

In the newly formed

dictatorship in Cuba, the army head of state was bulldozing
his congress and imprisoning political dissenters; in the
Dominican Republic, President Trujillo was killing or confining his political opponents; in Brazil, Fresident Vargas
was keeping his critics in jail; in Uruguay, President Terra
had flatly banned all political debates; in :peru, :fresident
lFranklin D. Roosevelt, text of address in "The
Inter-American Conference for the kaintenance of Peace,"
International ConCiliation (New York: Carnegie Endowment
for International peace, ~arch, 1937), No. 328, pp. 209-214.
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Benavides had recently cancelled an election when it was
apparent that he was losing; in Bolivia, in Faraguay, and
in Argentina, military dictatorship and feudal aristocracy
1

held absolute control.
There could be no stranger setting imaginable for
a speech by an American president to state that "we stand
shoulder to shoulder in our final determination that
others • • • • will find a hemisphere wholly prepared to
consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good."
The wonder is that the Buenos Aires Conference accomplished
what little it did.
lCf. Norbert Herring, "Exit the ~onroe Doctrine;
Buenos Aires Conferenoe," Harpars, April, 1937, pp. 449-458.
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LIlIU., 1938

The Eighth International Conference of American
States convened at Lima, Feru, under the handicap of great
expectations, on December 9, 1938.

The program for the

Conference carried most Significant and far reaching items:
)

(1) Ferfection and coordination of inter-~erican
peace instruments (including topics on investigation,
conciliation and arbitration, and the Code of :Peace;
definition of the aggressor, sanctions, and the
strengthening of means f or the prevention of war);
(2) Creation of an .I~ter-AmeriCan Court of International Justice; (3) Creation of a League or
~sociation of ~erican Nations; (4) Declaration
with respect to the American doctrine of the nonreoognition of territory acquired by force • • • •
~l

this was included under the section on the

organization of peace; economic problems to be discussed
1

were no less promising of large forward steps.
To the United States, especially, the promises held
forth by the Lima program were twice welcome

0

Two dangers

had arisen which seemed to threaten the increasing cordiality
among American nations resulting from the continuation of the
Good Neighbor policy and. the final settlement of peace in the
Chaco.

On the one hand, the Cardenas policy of expropriation

had caused friction between Mexico and the United States and
lFrogram of the Eighth International Conference of
States in Special Handbook ~ the ~ 2! Delegates
(Washington: The Fan Jimerican Union, 1938), p. 3.

~erican
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had awakened fears regarding the position of foreign capital
in other Latin .America countries.

On the other hand, the

drive of the Fascist powers to extend their influence in the
4mericas had increased since the Munich agreement and during
1

the losing fight of the Loyalists in Spain.
Significantly enough, the .merican -democracies·
deliberated at Lima in the hall of the Chamber of Deputies
which had not been used since the Chamber had met and been
2

dismissed two years before.
Lima, which, despite many

Aside from. the Declaration of

~ualifications,

went beyond all

previous statements of inter-American solidarity, the achievements of the Eighth Conference were disappointing.
The focal point of interest at Lima, from first to
last, was the

~uestion

of in ter-..iWl.erican solideri ty.

With

Secretary Hull as the spokesman, the American delegation
offered a program that strongly stressed the determination
of the American nations to oppose either a military or an
ideological invasion of the Western Hemisphere.

In his

opening address, Hull asserted that "an ominous shadow falls
athwart our own continent.-

He further declared:

"There

must not be a shadow of a doubt anywhere a s to the determination
lCf. Charles .... Thomson, "Results of the Lima Conference J"
Foreign I'olicy RePorts, XY, no. l",(March 15, 1939}, 1.
2New York Times, December 10. 1938, p. 8. Another note,
somewhat Off pitch, was an early speech by Feru's Dr. Carlos
Conda in Which he warned against implanting dartificial methods
of commerce on this continent"; at the time,~Peru was carrying
on a thriving barter trade with Germany.
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of the American nations not to permit the invasion of this
hemisphere by the armed forces of any power or any possible
combination of powers."

With no less zest, Hull criticized

doctrines and activities "utilized for the purpose of undermining and destroying in other nations established institutions of government and basic social order."

1

The concern of the United States to develop more effective inter-American cooperation against political and
cultural penetration and possible armed aggression was substantially supported at Lima by a Caribbean bloc of some
twelve nations, made up of Mexioo, the Central American
oountries, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and the three west
Indian republics.

As at Buenos Aires, Argentina, supported

by the neighboring state of Uruguay and, to a lesser degree,
by Paraguay and Bolivia, expressed a different point of view.
Determined by reasons of their own national selt-interest,
the policy ot these oountries indioated no alarm at any 1mmediate Nazi-Fasoist menaoe.

2

The task ot the Conterence

was to reconoile the oonflicting points ot view and at the
same t1me evolve a meaningful policy.
When the United States delegation was still en route
to Lima, an Argentine draft on inter-American solidarity was
IText ot speeoh is in

~.,

December 11, 1938, p. 14.

2Cf • Thomson,"Results of the Lima Conference," Foreign
Policy Reports, XV, No. 1 (March 15, 1939), 3. The!!! York
Times of Deoember 13, p. 2, carried a story to the etfec~at
BrazIl, Chile, and Argentina were atraid that any statement of
solidarity would bring economic reprisals from Germany.
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forwarded from Buenos £ires; it contained suggestions for
extending consultation to cover more than simply the threats
to peace specified in the Consultative Pact of the 1936 meeting.
The draft contained reference to

COmI~on

action against aggres-

sion, simply providing for general or regional meetings of the
l\a.inisters of Foreign Affairs of the ADlerican States, t'when
they deem it advisable. n

1

~

This was patently not strong enough

"'I

for the

~erican

delegation.

Immediately upon his arrival at Lima, Secretary Eull
discussed the solidarity question with Foreign Minister
2

Cantilo of Argentina and other delegates.

It was agreed that

the proposed measure should be reduced in technical rank from
a treaty to a declaration, and that the two questions of solidarity and consultation be temporarily separated, while attempts were made to fashion a formula for each.

Meanwhile,

on shipboard, the United states delegates had revised the
Argentine draft and had included a provision expressing common
concern in opposing subversive movements.

In his address to

the Conference on December 10, Dr. Cantilo coupled a pledge
1

Discussion of the solidarity agreement closely follows
that of Charles Thomson's report and of the ~ York Times.
Text of the Argentine draft is in Diario de la VIII Conferencia
Internacional Americana, Lima, No. 7~ (December 14, 1935), p. 434.
2Cantilo was not at Lima as a delegate, although he
addressed the conference. His visit was for six days, and for
a time there was feverish haste to evolve an acceptable solidarity agreement before he left for Buenos Aires. Cf. New
York Times, week of December 9.
---
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of general willingness to oppose aggression with refusal to
1

bind Argentina to specific commitments.
Two days later the

~gentine

Foreign Minister left

Lima with no agreement having been reached and with the morale
of the Conference at its low point.
dispatched a second

~gentine

draft.

On his way home, Cantilo
Brazil, Ouba, and

Mexico, however, urged a stronger statement.

Aa a consequence,

a third formula was worked out by delegates from

~eru,

and Argentina, which was hastily dispatched to Buenos
Oantilo, however, flatly rejected this draft.

Brazil,
~res.

There was nothing

to do but to return to Argentina's second formula; this was
done, and the problem seemed to have been solved.

The

Brazilian delegation threw a scare into the Oonference, however,
When it suspended action on the draft on orders from the home
government; it was only on December 24 that unanimous agreement became possible.

Consideration of the Declaration had

consumed almost the entire time, effort, and patience of the
Oonference.

wVhat did the all-important document say?

The Declaration first made note of the doubtful fact
that ttthe people of America have achieved spiritual unity
through the similarity of their republican institutions, their
unshakable will for peace, their profound sentiment of humanity
and tolerance, and through their absolute adherence to the
principles' of international law. ff

It then reaffirmed "the

lDiario, No.5, December 11, 1938, p. 281.
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oontinental sOlidarity· of the 4merioan republios and tttheir
purpose to oollaborate in the maintenanoe of the prinoiples
upon whioh the said solidarity is based • • • • their deoision to maintain them (the above mentioned prinoiples) and
to defend them against all foreign intervention or aotivity
that may threaten them. It

It further proolaimed for the .iJJleri-

oan states that "in a ase the p eaoe, seouri ty or territorial
integrity is thus threatened by aots of any nature that may
impair them, they proolaim their oommon oonoern and their determination to make effeotive their solidarity, ooordinating
their respeotive sovereign wills by means of the prooedure of
oonsultation • • • • using the measures whioh in eaoh oase the
oiroumstanoes may make advisable. n

The Deolaration added that

"it is understood that the Governments of the Amerioan Republios
will aot independently in their individual oapaoity, reoognizing
fully their juridioal equality as sovereign states," and provided "that in order to faoilitate the oonsultation • • • • the
'"
Ministers
for Foreign Affairs • • • • when deemed advisable and

at the initiative of anyone of them, will meet in their several
1

oapitals by rotation and without protooolary oharaoter."
The Lima Deolaration hardly did more than reiterate,
amplify, and make somewhat more explioit the deolaration made
at Buenos Aires in 1936, in whioh the ..Amerioan states had affirmed that ,fevery aot susoeptible to disturbing the feaoe of
lFinal ~J Text of Deolaration, p. 131.
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America affects each and everyone of them, and justifies
the initiation of the procedure of consultation."

Whether

the Lima measure greatly strengthened the ftcontinentalizationtt
of the Monroe Doctrine is hard to say.

Lima did hint at a

common action against subversive activities as well as open
armed attack; and, most important of all, it prescribed a
method for implementation through the clause providing for
consultation to be carried out through meetings of the
1

Foreign Ministers.

But beyond this there was nothing.

Nevertheless, the Declaration of Solidarity must be
2

entered on the credit side of the ledger;

what were the

debits, the disappointments of the Conference?
Disappointment I:
~sociation

of

~erican

Frojects for the creation of an

Nations, presented by Colombia and

the Dominican Republic, which had been referred to Lima by

l~ resolution, No. CVIl, on Improvement in the ~ro
cedure of Oonsultation provided that consultation might be
invoked for economic, cultural, and other q,uestions. Final
Act, p. 131.
2There were, of course, other manifestations of cooperation at Lima important enough to merit attention. They
included, in the field of economiCS, resolutions on the reduction of barriers to international trade, No. II, ibid.,
p. 20, and on the liberalization of inter-American commerce
and economic non-aggression, No. LXIII, ibid., p. 91; a
sweeping reiteration of American prinCiples, No. CX, ibid.,
po 133, and a specific re-statement of non-recognition-of
acq,uisition of territory by force, No. ~~, ibid., p. 54.
More important were resolutions directed against racial
or religious persecution, No. XXXVI, ibid., p. 62, and
ideological penetration, No. XXVII, ~., p. 55, and
no. lG.7III, ibid., po 56. In addition, there were the
usual slow steps made toward a codification of international
law, mainly in Resolution XVII, ~., p. 42.
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Buenos

~res,

were again evaded.

These important measures

were referred to a conference of jurists with the suggestion
1

that they be submitted to the Ninth Conference.
Disappointment

II~

The Mexican project of the Peace

Code, modified by the Committee of Experts to which it had
been referred, and a proposal from the United States for the
consolidation of American peace agreements were both referred
to the Fan American Union and International Conference of
2

American Jurists for consideration at the Ninth Conference.
Disappointment III:

Consideration of the project

to establish an Inter-American Court of Justice, which had
been referred from Convention to Convention from almost the
very first, was again postponed, with the declaration "that
...,

it is the firm purpose of the states of the

~erican

conti-

ment to establish an Inter-4merican Court of International
Justice, whenever these states may recognize the possibility
of doing so with complete assurance of success • • •
Disappointment IV:

•

fI

3

The entire problem of the defini-

tion of an aggressor and the application of sanctions was
referred to a later date.

4

1 Ibid. , Resolution XIV, p. 37.

2Ibid. , Resolution rf, p. 38.

3Ibid., Resolution £XV, p. 52.
4Ibid. , Resolution .£.XIV, p. 51.
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Disappointment V=

&

draft project pledging the

.American states not to employ armed force for the collection of public or contractual debts and not to intervene
diplomatically in support of pecuniary claims (unless there
was a denial of justice or an infraction of international
law) was debated inconclusively.

In addition to this draft,

Mexico and Argentina presented other projeots touohing on
the question of pecuniary olaims.

Rather than press the

projeots whioh had already started a heated debate, the
Conferenoe reoommended the problem for future study and
oonsideration at the next Conferenoe.
Disappointment VI:

1

In the eoonomio field, the best

the Conference oould produoe were the usual reoommendations
for reduotion of trade barriers and liberalization of inter2

American commerce.
Disappointment VII:

irobably the biggest failure of

all at Lima, according to John W. »bite of the New York Times
who seems to have been the only journalist exeroising critical
judgment there, was the failure of the United States to assume an aggressive leadership of the bloo standing for strong
cooperation.

Not only did the United States sidestep this

leadership, but, in inSisting upon unanimity at all oosts,
lCf. Charles A. Thomson,
Foreign ;Policy Reports, 1.'V, no. 1
2

Final

LXIII, p.

91.

~,

~Results of the ~ima Conference,~

~Maroh

15, 1939), 7-8.

Resolution II, p. 20; Final

~,

Resolution

~
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it did not allow another country to take the requisite
1

measures.

The criticism seems to be justified in the re-

sults of the Conference; nor did the Caribbean bloc accept
the results with e quan1mity.
Correspondent White stated that the Cubans were bitter
because the delegation of the United States had backtracked
on its promise to support Cuba's strong resolution calling
for the repudiation of all collective persecution r'for racial
and religious motives. d

Thisclearcut opportunity to align

'"'
the American states against
the new rise of anti-Semitism in

German-controlled regions was opposed by

~rgentina

other countries economically bound to Germany.

and the

The softening

of the Declaration to a statement that persecution "is contrary to the political and juridi cal systems of America ft was
acceded to readily by the United States and was regarded as an
act of betrayal by Cuba and the other Caribbean states.
Other criticisms of the leadership a t the Conference
were fundamental.

Mexican and Cuban delegates openly mourned

a muzzling of free debate; the steering committee was censured
for refusing to let the Conference receive Cuba's proposal
that the American nations offer mediation in the Spanish Civil
2

War;

ff

one prominent Central ..american delegate,tt on reading the
lNew ~ Times, December 21, 1938, p. 12.
2

Many observers were pointing out that a Rebel victory
in Spain would provide an opportunity for greater Fascist pene~
tration in South £merica. Spain's close cultural ties with
South America were particularly teared.
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final draft of the solidarity deolaration. was quoted as
saying:
We are going home to restudy our whole position
with regard to future ian ..unerioan Conferenoes. If
this is an example of what they are to be, they are
a waste of time and not worth the expense of sending delegates to them. l
The oonstantly oompromising position of the United
States was made more marked by the open Nazi efforts to
sabotage the Conferenoe.

As early as Deoember 6, a oorre-

spondent wrote, -It would be foolish to pretend that the

...

Rome-Berlin

~is

is not exerting strong influenoe in the

forthooming oonferenoe. d

...

John \Vhite reoorded that the

tt,a.gents of the Rome-Berlin .ais have begun a determined
fight to prevent formation at Lima of a £en Amerioan AXis
that

~ght

strengthen the United States at Germany and Italy's

expense in South Amerioa."

White gave as an example of German

methodology an advertised leoture on aroheological research in
Peru by Professor A. Ubbelolide-Doering of Munioh; instead of
a disoussion of the re oent digging in Peru, "his audienoe heard
a soathing attack on ian Americanism and

~resident

'bugbear' of a German invasion of South Amerioa."

2

Roosevelt's
At the

Conferenoe, itself, a disproportionate number of both German
and Italian "observers" were on hand.
IJohn W. ~Yhite in the ~ York Times, Deoember 21, 1938,
p. 12.
2 Ibid., December 6, 1938, p. 1.
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Flaoed in a defensive position, the United States
achieved neither the more desirable result nor the more respeoted position that might have been gained through an aggressive attack on the attacker.

On the other hand, it oan-

not be doubted that the tactics pursued by the United States
were in great part responsible for whatever the Conference
finally did achieve.

In contrast to

~unich,

Lima stood not

for coercion but for voluntary agreement.
In this field, Lima conserved the gains made at
Montevideo and Buenos Aireso It took no backward stepso
~t a time when general retreat characterized the forces
of peaceful cooperation, and international understanding,
it held ground previously won ind kept the road open for
further advance in ~!e future.
The achievements at

~ima

-- specifically; (I) the amplification

of the continental Monroe Doctrine through the Solidarity

~ree

ments; (2) the measures advocating the principle of free trade;
and (3) the gentle criticism of German racial persecutions
these steps, such as they were, represented defeat for the
ten~ts

at~

of the Fascist nations to scuttle the Lima Conference.
But German propaganda did not prevent more significant

achievements.

~ore

fundamental reasons for the failure were

suggested by the following conversation between :.t'rofessor
Samuel Guy Inman of the United
~inister

~tates

and Foreign

~fairs

Oantilo ofAXgentina;

lOf. Charles ~. Thomson, nResults of the Lima Conference,d
Foreign Foliey Reports., XV, no. l",,(lIdarch 15, 1939) 8.
. .,
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Inman:

But you and
What way?

Cantilo:

We differ in this, Mr. Hull seems to get
his key from what is outside this continent.
He expressed his fear of what Europe or .sia,
with their new ideologies might do to America,
so he wants us to arm. I get my key from
America itself. I say our busi ness is to go
forward in building our American life in the
aerican spirit. ·When a nation from the outside really threatens us, then is the time
we are to take decisive and united action to
defend ourselves.

Inman:

Doesn't it seem to you, Dr. Cantilo, that
Chancellor Hitler might be starting off on
a second Napoleonic era?

Cantilo:

No, I do not at present see that. What I
do think is that America ought to stand
solidly together for its own development.
Our program ought to be drawn not because
we fear an outside enemy, but because we
want to make a strong .America. The position
of the United States is different from that
of Latin ~erican countries. You must face
certain wor Id pro bleme wh ich are not ours.
The United States worked out its problem
with China, its strong pOSition in the rhilippines and Hawaii, not from an inter-America standpoint, but based on your own national interests.
So today you naturally work out your world relations according to your own ideas. But then
the United States brings that position here to
us in Latin 4merica and says, "Let us adopt
this as a ran American policy."~ We do not
like this.
~

Inman:

Mister ~inister, why is it that Argentina always
seems to be so near to Europe?

Cantilo:

¥.-ell, in the first place, in Ju'gentina our population contains an enormous number of Italians,
Spanish, French, Germans, and other European
people. Equally import~t is that Europe is
our market and we sell it most of our products.
The United States buys practically nothing
from us. Did you know th at in the l' 1r st e igh t

y~.

Hull did differ, then?

In
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months of 1938 Argentina bought more from the
United States then we did from England, our
best customers? And what did the United St~tes
buy from us? How can we expect to forget all
about the people who give lifeblood to our
nation and buy our products?
ISarnuel Guy Inman, "Lima Conference and the Totalitarian Issue,ft ~ Jnnals 2! ~ £merican Academy ~ Fo1itica1
and Social Sc~ence, CCIV (July, 1939), 10. This issue of The
Innais contains a supplement on "The Lima Conference and t~
Future of Fan 4mericanism. ft
~

CHAPTER V

PANAMA, 1939 - HAVANA, 1940

CHJl'TER V

1939 - HAVANA, 1940

F~AMA,

September, 1939, marked the beginning of the war
in Europe and the beginning of a new phase in Fan
relations.

~erican

The speed with which the first Consultative

Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics was convened at Panama demonstrated the concern of
1

the American states over the European war.

The primary con-

cern of the meeting, which started on September 23, waS in
maintaining the collective neutrality of the states of the
two Americas and in minimizing the economic effects of the
2

war on the hemisphere.

Iorior to the gathering, there were

the usual German attempts to create dissenSion, John \.hite
reporting from Buenos Aires that "German propaganda agencies
are flooding Latin America with warnings that the neutrality
conference at Fanama is merely a guise for trapping the
lThe Conference was jointly initiated by the governments of ~gentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, ranama,
Feru, and the United states. These countries agreed on
:Panama as a meeting place, and invitations were issued by the
Secretary of Foreign ~fairs of that nation. Text of invitation is in The Conferences of American States, ppo 315-316.
Cf. also Re~t ~ the Delegates of the UnIted States £!
Amerioa ~he Meet'Iiii .£!. ~ ForeTgii"1:rinIsters E!.. ~ Juneri~
oan Republios (Washington:--U. S. Government Printing Office,

'ffio ), p. 3

0

2Just three days before the meeting oonvened, President
Roosevelt declared that his policy for the United States was
motivated by rtone single, hard-headed thought -- keeping
America out of war.d ~ 12!! Times, September 21, 1939, p. 1.

61

South

~erican

Republics into becoming protectorates of the
1

United States.1f
One of the few open references to d ictatorshi..? in
America ever made at the

~an ~erican

meetings came with the

inaugural speech of }resident Juan Demostenes

of

~osemena

Fanama, who attempted to dissooiate the Americas from totalitarianism, explaining that the numerous South American dictatorships were "patriarchal manifestations springing from
2

the inability of certain classes to govern themselves. II
Significant legislation to insure the collective
neutrality of the American states was promulgated at the
meeting.

Measures included:
1.

A general declaration, whioh "reaffirmed the

status of general neutrality of the .American republios."
The states were left free "to regulate in their individual
and sovereign capacities the manner in which they were to
give it specific application"; but oollectively they resolved to Ifhave their rights and status as neutrals fully
1
2

Ibid., September 24, 1939, p. 42.

Ibid., p. 1. Only three plenary sessions of the
meeting were-made public. Brief minutes of the other general
sessions were made, but no record of the committee proceedings
was kept. Cf. Re?ort ~ ~ Meeting of ~ ~inisters of
Forei~ ~fairs 0 lh! Amer~can Republics, submitted to the
Govern ng Board of the Fan American Union by the Director
General, "Congress and Conference Series·t (vJashington: :E'an
American Union, 1939), No. 29, p. 3.
~
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respeoted and observed."

The JUnerioan nations deolared oertain

standards existent whioh they would uphold in their status as
neutrals.

To this end, they agreed, among other things, to

prevent their respective territories -- land, sea, or air -from being used as bases for belligerent operations; and to
prevent in their territories the enlistment of persons to
serve in the armed foroes of a belligerent, the setting forth
of military expeditions in the interest of a belligerent,
or the fitting out and arming of vessels for belligerents.
The deolaration further asserted that the American nations
would maintain close oontaot in order to bring into uniformity,
so far as possible, the measures they adopted for the enforoe1

ment of their neutral rights.
2.

The Declaration of Panama, which set forth the

highly publicized, but now forgotten, neutrality zone.

This

lr'General Deolaration of Neutrality of the .&merican
Republics,· Resolution V, printed in International Conferences
of ~ericaR States, p. 326. l~e Declaration also set up an
lnter-American Neutrality Committee of seven experts to study
and to formulate neutrality measures. Further resolutions
dealing with the attitude of this hemisphere toward the war
were on Coordination of £olioe and Judicial ~easures for the
Maintenance of Neutrality, No. VIII, ibid., pp. 331-332,
whioh provided for the formulation of-common rules of action
"of the polioe and judioial authorities • • • • in preventing
or repressing unlawful activities that individuals, whether
they be nationals or aliens, may attempt in favor of a foreign
belligerent state"; on Contraband of War, No. VII, ibid.,
p. 330, whioh registered oPPosition to the placing of foodstuffs
and clothing for civilian populations on the lists of contrabands; and on the Humanization of viar, No. VI, ibid., p. 329.
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interesting document stated that nthe nature of the present
conflagration • •

0

•

would not justify any obstructions to

inter-American communications which, engendered by important
interests, call for adequate protection."

In view of til is

fact, theA.merican republics declared, as a measure of continental self-protection, that so long as they maintained their
neutrality, they "are as of inherent right entitled to hu.ve
those ',tvaters adjacent to the american continent, which they
regard as of primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the cOIDnlission of any hostile act by any
non-~erican

belligerent nation, vmether such hostile act be
1

attempted or made from land, sea or air. lt

The neutrality

zone set forth roughly followed the contours of both 4mericas
at a distance of about three hundred miles from shore.

The

declaration excluded the territorial waters of Canada and of
the colonies and possessions of European countries in the
hemisphere; this was legal fiction, however, it being a physical impossibility to separate these waters from those of the
£merican nations.
Shortly after the Fanama meeting it became apparent
that the United States was not interested in maintaining strict
neutrality;

conse~uently,

ent interest.

these declarations were of but transi-

The more permanent contributions of the ranama

Conference, therefore, fell in the field of economics.
lIbido, pp. 334-337.
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The resolution on economic cooperation repeated the
time-worn shibboleth recommending that the governments do
everything possible to abolish obstacles to free
can trade.

inter-~eri-

But it went further and, for the first time, cre-

ated an organization -- the J.merican Financial and Econo.mic
.dvisory Committee, consisting of twenty-one experts, one
from each of the American republics.

Functions of this com-

mittee were widespread; its specific duties were to consider
problems of monetary relationships and foreign exchange;
effective measures for mutual cooperation to mitigate dislocations of foreign trade affected by the war; and the
possibility of establishing customs truces.

1

In addition to the neutrality and economic measures
taken at Fanama, a series of other resolutions, most of which
were aimed at the maintenance of peaceful relations among the
nations, was also promulgated.

~erican

They included.

(a) a reaffirmation of the Lima Declaration of Continental
2

Solidarity;

(b) an assertion of the faith of

~erican

nations

lIbid., Resolution III, pp. 322-326. The resolution also
recommendea-that the governments do everything possible to
abolish obstacles to the free inter-,Americs.n movement of capital,
and the negotiation of agreements to facilitate inter-American
credit, to attempt to prevent excessive increase in the price of
manufactured articles. In addition, it urged that the governments make every effort to complete their respective sections
of the ran msrican Highway.
2

~.,

Resolution IV, p. 326.
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in the maintenanoe of international aotivities in aocordanoe
with Christian morality;l (0) a reoommendation to the 4Unerioan states to eradicate the spread of subversive ideologies
2

to proteot the "oommon inter-..A!Ilerioan democratio ideal";
and (d) a provision to hold another meeting of Foreign
3
~inisters,

with an additional proviso for an immediate meet-

ing in the case of a transfer of sovereignty of geographio
4

regions of the

~erioas

held by non-American states.

By the time the seoond

~eeting

of Foreign

~inisters

was held in Havana, from July 21 to July 30, 1940, interest
and emphasis had shifted away from neutrality to problems of
hemispherio defense.

The German viotory in France, the taking

of Denmark, Norway, and the Low Countries, and the threatened
invasion of Great Britain had brought the war oons jd erably
closer to America; politically closer because Danish, Dutch,
and Frenoh possessions in this hemisphere were no longer controlled by "friendly democracies"; economically closer, becaus e
the expansion of the war had created a crisis in Latin
exports.

~erioan

In addition, fear was rampant that the alarming

llli£. , Resolution IX, p. 332.
2~., Resolution XI, p. 333.

3

~.J

Resolution XII, p. 334.

4Ibid. , Resolution XVI, p. 338.
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extension of Nazi activities indicated that Germany would seek
economic or political domination on this continent, once vic1

torious in Europe.
In the month preceding the meeting, the Uni ted States

took several steps that were indicative ot the coming

CJ

urse

2

of action at Havana:
1.

On June 17, Secretary Hull instructed the foreign

offices at Berlin and Rome to inform Germany and Italy that
"the United States would not recognize any transfer, and would
lot. ~. R. Elliott, r'J£uropean Colonies in the Western
FOliC Reports (~ugust 15, 1940), and
-The avana Conference of ~940,M Foreign
l;-olicy Reports (i;jeptember 15, 1940). Totali tar lan pl:essure
on the American states and totalitarian activity within these
states was stronger before the Havana meeting than ever before. On the eve of the Conference, Dr. otto Reinebeck,
German Minister to zanama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and E1 Salvador, delivered notes to all these
countries, except Fanama, warning them that the Conference
would move them away from neutrality and that Germany would
retaliate, should the delegates act against that country.
Time (July 22, 1940), p. 14. (Secretary Hull subseQuently
liIrback at this "intimidation" with vigor.) .... dispatch in
the New York Times from Berlin~onJuly 12 (p. 6) said that
Goering t s newspaper, the Essener 1~e.ziona1 Zei tuna' warned
the South American nations against aliowIng thenited ~tates
to impose a monopoly over their exports and thereby jeopardize
their post-war trade. On July 16, dispatches i~ the ~ ~ork
Times (p. 12) told of the Nazis spending from flfty to a undred thousand dollars a month for propaganda activities in
Chile and of the putting down of a Nazi putsch in that country.
~t the Conference, itself, Germany had three active propagandist observers, Dr. Reinebeck, Stepman Tauchnitz, Charge d'~
feires at Havana, and George Leisewitz, secretary of the German
Legation at Santiago.
~emisphere,M Forei~n
~oward J. T~uebl~o ,

n

2"'dapted from Howard J. Trueblood, "The Havana Conference
of 1940," Foreign Folicy Reports (September~15, 1940), pp. 2-3.
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not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic
region of the Western Hemisphere from one
to another non-Amer ican power. If

non-~erican

power

Subsequently, the French,

British, and Dutch governments were similarly notified.
2.

Shortly thereafter, Congress passed resolutions

containing similar "hands off" warnings and stating that the
""

United States would consult immediately with the other

~eri-

can states in regard to measures necessary to protect their
1

interests.
3.

The Washington administration announced it was

contemplating a vastly enlarged program of Latin
economic cooperation; on June 22,

~resident

~erican

Roosevelt an-

nounced a cartel plan providing for "an effective system of
joint marketing of the impartant staple exports of the .meri2

can republics."
4.
States

Almost simultaneously, Edwin C. Wilson, United

~inister

to Uruguay, made an authorized announcement

that "it is the intention and avowed policy of my Government
~

to cooperate fully, whenever such cooperation is desired, with
all the other American governments in crushing all activities
which arise from non-American sources and which imperil our
poli tical and economic freedom. I'

The United States pointedly

chose to have this armouncement made in a sll.l.all, far-away,
1 Cf. New York Times, June 18, 19, 1940, p. 1.

2Ibid ., June 24, 1940, p. 1.
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and poorly armed country which had just been shaken by the
discovery of a Nazi plot to seize control of its government.
These four measures converged into the focal point
of interest at the Havana hleeting; the main purpose of the
United States at the meeting was to aChieve backing and cooperation from the other

~erican

states for its armounced

policy in regard to European possessions in this hemisphere.
In his address before the Conference on July 22, Hull stated
that the United States was in favor of "the ests.blishment of
a collective trusteeship, to be exercised in the name of all
the J.merican republics," for European territory in4merica
threatened by a change of

o~nership.

The Secretary of State

denied that the trusteeship would carry with it any thought
of the creation of a special interest by any American republic and suggested that "as soon as conditions permit, the
region should be restored to its original sovereign or be
declared independent when able to e sts.blish and maintain stable
1

self-government."
As usual, Argentina supplied the main, and in this
case, about the only opposition to the plan of the United
States.

Divergence was not fundamental, the chief point at

issue being the urgency of the question.
its delegate, Dr. Leopoldo

~elo,

Argentina, through

argued that there was no need

for haste since the danger of the transfer of sovereignty that
lText of the address in U. S. Department of State,
Bulletin, July 27, 1940.
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the United States feared was j'purely hypothetical"; that so
long as the British fleet

~~s

intact and the Germans remained
1

prisoners of the continent, no danger existed.

'l'he Argen-

tines also contended that, under the circumstances, the act
of assuming administration over a given

~uropean

colony might

be tantamount to an act of vvar, which only the £rgentine Congress could declare.
But Argentina, this time, stood alone against an almost solid phalanx of the other twenty countries, led by the
United States.

A deadlock threatened for the first four days

of the nine-day meeting, but the result was inevitable; a compromise was effected, with 4Xgentina giving most of the ground.
Virtually the sole concession made to the southern recalcitrant
was the use of the phrase "provisional administration" instead
of Ifmandate" or "joint protectorate. f'
The Convention on the Frovisional

~dministration

of

European Oolonies and ¥ossessions in the Americas and the

~ct

of Havana, which supplemented the more formal treaty, were
final steps in the "con tinentalization lt of the ..v..onroe Doctrine.
The 16.ct of Havana, itself, was a temporary measure to cope
with the problem of the European possessions until the convention could be approved by the various governments.

The

act first states that I'the status of regions on this continent
lOf. "Twenty nations and One," Fortune, XXII,
(September, 1940), ? 4.

.i.'W.

:3
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belonging to European powers is a subject of deep concern
to all of the Governments of the .&merican Republics.· t

The

American countries recognized that tlas a result of the present
European war there may be attempts at conquest •• • • thus
placing in danger the essenoe and pattern of the institutions
of Ameri ca. ff

The aot deolared "that when islands or regi ons

in the iiJUericas now under the possession of non-a.merican
n~tions

are in danger of becoming the subject of barter of

territory or change of soverej.gnty, the

~erican

nations,

taking into account the illlperative need of oontinental security and the desires of the inhabitants of the said islanas
or regions, may set up a regime of provisional auministration
• • • • "

~nong

the conditions of the administration

WaS

the

stipulation tfthat as soon as the reasons reCiuiring this me9.sure
shall cease to exist," the possessions would either be made
~

independent, I'if it shall appear that they are 8ble to constitute and maintain themselves in such condition, or be restored to their pr8vious st9.tus, whichever of these alternatives shall appear the more practicable and just."

Llore-

over, "this adm inlstration shall be exercised with the twofold purpose of c ontribut ing to the se curl ty and defense of
the Continent, and to the economic, political and social
progress of such regions • • • •
~rovided

It

in the act was the creation of an emergency

committee, subject to call at the request of any Signatory,
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whose duty should be the assumption of the administration of
a region attacked or threatened "if it beoomes necessary as
an imperative emergency measure before the coming into

ef~

fect of the convention approved by this Oonsultative keeting
• •

• •

"

~

significant proviso of the Act of Havana states

that I'should the need for emergency action be so urgent that
action by the

co~nittee

cannot be awaited, any of the

~erican

Republics, individually or jointly with others, shall have the
right to act in the manner which its own defense or that of the
continent requires. If

1

The oonvention, signed by the delegates on July 19,
was essentially an amplification of the principles laid down
by the Act of Havana; the oonvention provided detailed legal
machinery for the possible administration of

~uropean

possessions.

In many ways, it was even stronger than the teillporary act.

It

stated, for example, that "no transfer or attempt to transfer
or aoquire any interest or right in any such region (territories
of

non-~erican

countries located in this hemisphere), directly

or indirectly, would be reoognized or accepted by the American
RePublics, no matter what form was employed to attain such
purposes."

The oonven tion specif ically exelnpted from its

provisions "territories or possessions which are the subject

~tates,

lText in The International Conferences of 4ll.er'icbn
pp. 364-5:---
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of dispute or claims between European povvers and one or more
of the republics of the ..iwnericas. n

1

In addition to the problem of the European colonies,
further considerations of neutrality and foreign activities, and
of economic and financial cooperation C9.me before the Conference.
The Committee on Neutrality was deluged with projects designed
to protect the Western Hemisphere from Fifth Column activities.
The most important of these, on the suppression of activities
directed from abroad against domestic insti tutions, was sub2

mitted by the United states.

vv i th Uruguay, the United State s

presented projects designed to prevent political activities
3

on the part of consular and diplomatic agents,

viliile

~gentina

advanced a plan for the coordination of police and judicial
4

measures o

~long

the same line, Cuba proposed precautionary
5

measures with ref.erence to the issuance of passports.
these measures were approved by the Conference.

.ill

.uso approved

IChief regions of this category are British Honduras
and the Falkland Islands, long in dispute between Guatemala
and Argentine and Great Britain. Text of the Convention in
ibid., pp. 373-377. Chile, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela signed with reservations.
2 Ibid.,

Resolution VI, pp. 351-352.

3Ibid., Resolution II, p. 3510
4Ib id., Resolution III.
5Ib id., Resolution V, p. 353.
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were a resolution condemning hostilities within the territorial
waters as def ined at the :C'anama Meeting

1

and the usual recom2

mendation for the promotion of continental solidarity.
long series of recommendations from the Inter-£merican Neutrality Committee, with a number of projects submitted by the
various countries, were referred back to the Committee, with
3

a vote of applause and congratulations for its previous work.
More important than these measures were the steps
taken in the field of economic cooperation.

There was no men-

tion made at Havana of t he cartel plan which had been prominently discussed prior to the Conference; this gigantic marketing project had run up against many difficulties as

~Bll

lack of enthusiasm from the other

On the

~erican

states.

as a

day that Secretary Hull made his economic recommendations at
Havana, iresident Roosevelt announced his substitute for the
cartel, a request that Congress "give prompt consideration to
increasing the capital and lending power of the Export-Import
Bank of Washington by i500,OOO,OOO, and removing some of the
restrictions on its operations to the end that the bank may
be of greater existence to our neighbors south of the Rio Grande,
including finanCing, the handling and marketing of some part
lIbid., Resolution XIII, p. 359.
2Ibid ., Resolution XII, p. 358.
3Ibid., Resolution It p. 349.
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1

of their

surpluses.~

The Havana resolution on economics substantially
represented Hull's recommendations.

It included a declara-

tion that the American nations should "continue to adhere
to the li beral principles of international trade, It be willing
to conduct trade with any non-American country in accordance
with these free principles, and "do everything in their
power to strengthen their own economio position."

The 4m.eri-

can states further pledged 'fto improve further the trade and
other economio rela tions between and among themselves; and
to devise and apply appropriate means of effective action to
cope with the difficulties, disadVantages and dangers arising
from the present disturbed and dislocated world conditions."
The delegates voted to provide for the strengthening and expansion of the activities of the Inter-American Financial and
Economic Advisory Committee and instructed this committee to
proceed with the promotion of a long list of cooperative activities.

Among the most important duties given the committee

was the creation of instruments to facilitate the disposition
of American surplus commodities and to develop commodity ar-:rangements with a view to assuring equitable terms for both
2

producers and consumers of the commodities concerned.
lU. S. Department of State, Bulletin, July 27, 1940, p. 41.
2The International Conferences of 4merican 5tates,
Resolution-IXv, pp. 368-370.
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The two meetings of foreign ministers demonstrated,
first of all, the efficacy of the consultative procedures
set up by the American nations at their preceding conferences.
That the first meeting could be held less than a month after
the outbreak of war was testimony to the fact that the previous
inter-American conferences were productive of a genuinely cooperative attitude.

But neither meeting accomplished what

reasonably might have been expected of it.
As the result of an extremely short-sighted policy on
the part of the United States, the political measures taken at
I'anama were soon forgotten.

When it became apparent that the

neutrality zone, for example,

~nuld

work more hardships an

Great Britain than on Germany, the United States lost all in1

terest in enforcing it;

since the other

~erican

states

possessed no power to enforce the zone, if they did have the
inclination, the neutrality legislation soon became meaningless.
This situation arose, of course, as the result of the policy
of the United States, sponsoring a measure one month it had
no desire to enforce the next.

As a consequence, the other

American nations were in an advantageous pOSition to criticize
the bad faith of the United States.
lVery interesting are the documents of the protest of
the American republics and the replies of Germany and England
on the Graf Spee incident. Cf. Bulletin 2! ~ ~ ~erican
Union, 74 (May, 1940), 403-8.
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The creation of the Inter-American ]'inancial and
Economic Advisory Committee at :fanama was an important step
for~ard;

yet the committee, itself, accomplished little be-

tween consultations; as a matter of fact, the members of the
1

committee rarely attended their own meetings.

In the face

of these facts, the Havana meeting did no more than tender the
2

commi ttee a vote of thanks and burden it with .many new functions.
The major achievements at Havana were represented by
the Act of Havana and the Convention on the .rrovisional ....dministration of European Colonies.
the

~!onroe

Through these measures,

Doctrine finally became a continental doctrine;

'wi th them, the American nat ions set up effective machinery to
act rapidly in the event any chBnge in the status of
colonies occurred or threatened to occur.

~uropean

Never before in the

history of inter-American relations had measures for a common
end been set forth more s traigh tforwardly.

Here, too, however,

the real test will come if and when the £merican states put
these measures into action.
The ultimate purpose of

~an

Americanism in 1939 and 1940,

considering the tenor of the times, should have been to weld the
Aw.ericas into a solid military and economic bloc against totalitarianism.

Against the European background, the measures of

lef. Fortune, XXII, 1~0. 3 (September, 1940), 141.

2 0f • supra, p. 74.
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ranama and Havana appear inconclusive

4

In kr. null's own

words, they are a "clearing of the decks."

Yet they Viere

the fullest expressions of the fan-.merican movement under
emergency conditions and after more than fifty years of
evolution.

CHAPTER VI
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

CHAPTER VI
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM
The chief political danger to the Western Hemisphere
rests in the economic threat of a Nazi-dominated Europe.
This Europe would need vast supplies of food and raw materials
from Latin America and could produce great quantities of finished goods for exchange.

It also would probably have sup-

plies of armaments for sale oil terms attractive to South
American countries with military ambitions.
The United States normally takes only one-third of
Latin America's total exports, while Europe consumes fram
one-half to two-thirds of these products; consequently,
Germany's bargaining powe'r would be stronger than that of the
United States.

And the head start would be lengthened further

by an expansion of Germany's potent barter s.ystem.

Thus, even

if Central and South America were in thorough disagreement with
the theory of Nazi politics and the practice of Nazi trade
policy, which is a moot point, those countries could not decline the opportunity to sell their great surpluses to Europe.
Few of the Central American and none of the South American
countries could, under current circumstances, reject German
trade terms even though those terms were accompanied by
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political infiltration.

1

German domination in the lower Americas, whether
political or economic, would be a threat to the supplies of
the United States both in war and peace.

In strategic mater-

ials, Latin American sources are of tremendous value to this
country, even though many Latin American products essential
to national defense are of minor significance in the region's
total export values.

The Army and Navy Munitions Board lists

fourteen strategic materials "for which strict conservation
and distribution control measures will be necessary."

They

are antimony, chromium, cocoanut shell char, ferro-grade
manganese, manila fiber, mercury, mica, nickel, quartz crystal,
quinine, rubber, silk, tin, and tungsten.

The Central and

South American states produce many of these in quantity for
export to the United States, while others are available in
2

limited amounts and are

ca~able

of further production.

Latin American sources are also needed for the peacetime economy of the United States.

The southern republics

have almost a monopoly on bauxite, from which aluminum is made,
lHoward J. Trueblood, "Economio Defense of the Americas," Foreign Policy ReEorts, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1~40),
127. One of the most ex austive stUdies on inter-American
economics is M. Ezekiel's "Economic Relations between the
Americas," International Conciliation, No. 367 (February, 1941).
2Howard J. Trueblood, "Economic Defense of the Americas," Foreign Policy Reports, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1940),
129.
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and on bananas, Brazil nuts, oarnauba wax, oastor beans, ohiole,
ooffee, flaxseed, and other important produots.

In addition,

the Southern republios supply large quantities of sisal and
henequen, sugar, cacao, hides and skins, manganese, and wool.
Under normal circumstance s , it would be difficult to shift
these purchases to other parts of the world; under conditions
of war time, it would be virtually impossible.

1

If the Ger.man competition for these products of the
Southern Americas were merely the old-fashioned trade rivalry
of the last century. the problem would be an eoonomio and not
a political one.

But totalitarian Germany has added new twists

that enable the Nazis to out-trade even the trading Yankee;
and Ger.many aocompanies her trade with oultural and political
infiltration.

The result is cause for worry on two scores.

The secret of Ger.man trade success is simple and forthright despite the attempts of some commentators to make it seem
oomplex and Maohiavellian.

Purpose of Nazi trade has been pro-

duots, not profits; unencumbered by a profit and loss statement,
Ger.many has been able to offer attraotive terms of trade to
Pan American states; possessing bulging surpluses, warehoused by
world-wide trade restrictions, these states have oarried on a
thriving business with Germany.

Having no plaoe else to dis-

pose of their goods, the South American states have traded on
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German terms.

These terms, usually, have been the well known

barter deals under which the Pan American nations have accepted
payment for their goods in ASKI marks which can be used only
for the purchase of German goods.

Under this system, which is

backed in Germany by large, secret, and arbitrary export subsidies, the Nazis made amazing economic gains in the Southern
Americas before the war.

In 1936, Germany's best year, the

Nazis pushed the United States out of first place as an exporter to Brazil and Chile and. supplanted Great Britain in
second place (after the United States) in Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Venezuela.

1

A good deal of the talk concerning German economic advances in Central and South America that dwells on the danger
to the United States is, from the evidence that can be gathered,
somewhat fallacious.

While there is no doubt that Germany has

made tremendous strides forward, most of her

~ins

in later years

have been at the expense of the third economic rival, Great Britain.
Thus, in 1929, the United States, Great Britain, and
Germany, together with Japan, exported approximately $1,612,000,000
worth of goods to Latin America, an amount equal to 59.5 per cent
of total Latin American imports during that year.

Of this total,

lFortune, XXII, No.3 (September, 1940), 137.
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the share of the United States was the lion's, 60.3 per cent,
followed by Great Britain with 24.0 per cent, Germany with
14.8 per cent, and Japan a very poor fourth with 0.9 per cent.
After 1929, the share of the United States shrank steadily
until the low point of 48.0 per cent was reached in 1933, while
Britain, Germany, and Japan increased their proportions to 32.2,
17.5, and 2.3 per cent, respectively.
The years from 1933 to 1936 witnessed a new increase in
Latin American purchasing power and the greatest expansion in
Germany's slice of the melon; during this period, too, the four
competing nations increased their share of the total import
trade of Latin America fram 51.1 per cent to an estimated 59.3
per cent.

In this period of greatest German activity, the com-

petitive position of the United States showed a slight improvement, her percentage of the total exports within the group
rising fram 48 per cent to 49.6 per cent.

The significant fact

is that during this t!me Great Britain's share dropped from
32.3 per cent to 23.1 per cent of the total, while Germany's
portion jumped fram 14.8 per cent in 1929 and 17.4 per cent in
1933 to 23.6 per cent in 1936.

(Japan's increase in the three-

year period was from 2.3 per cent to 3.7 per cent.)

Thus in

the total Latin American trade, Britain, which before 1914 had
held first place, was relegated to third place in 1936; Germany
advanced at Britain's expense almost exclusively from 1933 to
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1936, though, partly due to Germany's activities, the United
States bad not reached her preeminence of 1929.

1

In reality -- and this is a much overlooked tact -- the
problem of hemispheric economic solidarity is not a Pan American
problem, but a South American one.

Dependence on the United

States as a market for Latin American exports decreases markedly
from north to south; the troubles lie in the south.

2

The Caribbean countries as a whole sell such a large
proportion of their exports to ~':the United States, over 45 per
cent during 1938, for example, that this group falls naturally
within the economic orbit of the United States.

Seven of these

countries, 1938, sold 60 per cent or more of their exports to
the United States: Panama sold 89.2 per cent; Honduras, 86.5
per cent; Cuba, 76 per cent; Guatemala, 69.4 per cent; Mexico,
67.4 per cent; Nicaragua, 67.3 per cent; and El Salvador, 61.8
per cent.

In addition, Panama is almost completely dependent

upon this country as a result of the influence of the Canal,
while expenditures of American tourists are of large importance
to Cuba, Guatemala, and Mexico.

In these countries, the problem

of economic solidarity is no problem at all.

,
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Of the remaining Caribbean countries, the Dominican
Republic, Haiti, Costa Rica, and Colombia are only slightly
less dependent upon the United States, since they sold approximately 44 per cent of their total exports to this country.
In the entire Caribbean area, only one country, Venezuela, does
not find her chief export market in the United States, only
13.2 per cent of her exports coming to this country in 1938.
But Venezuela is strongly tied to the United States by a large
indirect trade through the West Indies and by North American
control of its oil fields, which are its main economic asset.
South American states present the

headach~.

This bloc

of eight states accounted for 58 per cent of all Latin American
exports in 1938.

Brazil, of this group, is closest economically

to the United States, the latter country absorbing slightly
more than 33 per cent of the former's exports; Uruguay is economically most distant, the United States taking only 4 per cent of
that country's exports.

In between these extremes, the West

Coast States -- Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru -- sold to
the United States about 20 per cent of their total exports,
While, on the East Coast, Paraguay and Argentina sent 12.2 per
cent and 8.5 per cent, respectively, of their products northward.
Complicating factors in the situation are: (1) two of
the three largest exporting countries -- Argentina and Chile .-

85
lie within the economically distant group; and (2) to a very
marked extent the South American surplus commodity problem concerns these countries and Brazil, which does not actually lie
within the economic orbit ot the United States.

In 1938, the

total exports ot these three states was valued at $908,400,000,

ot which only $175,300,000 went to the United States, a balance
of $751,100,000 sold elsewhere.

While the last sum includes

shipments to other Western Hemisphere markets, a large surplus
of grains, meat, cotton, copper, and nitrates -- the out stand ing
products in a long list of surpluses
outside the hemisphere.

1

remained for disposal

The essential problem tor economic

solidarity of the hemisphere lie s in the disposition of the
75 per cent ot Argentina's exports, the more than 50 per cent
of Chile's exports, and the 50 per cent ot Brazil's exports that
2

normally go to Europe and to Asia.
War in Europe provided both an opportunity and a problem
to the United States in her program of cementing economic solidarity.

Opportunity arose as the result of sources ot supply being

closed to the southern countries; the problem was the disposal
of South American products that normally would have gpne to
Europe.

During the first six months of the war, the United

Lrrueblood, "Economic Defense 0 f the Americas," Fore ign
Policy Reports, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1940), 129.
2Cf • Hispanic-American Historical Review (November, 1940),
p. 664.
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States' imports trom Latin America were valued at $285,280,000,
as compared with $215,273,000 in the same period of 1938-39.
This increase of 32.5 per cent in six months meant an annual
dollar rise of about $140,000,000.

Sugar, wool, hides, skins,

and copper contributed largely to the general expansion, and
some minor products recorded large gains as well.

There was,

however, only a slight increase in the value of imports of
some of the leading products of South America, such as coffee,
cacao, bananas, meats, and petroleum.
During the same six months period, exports tram the
United States to Latin America rose to $359,664,000, as contrasted to $234,201,000 in the last comparable period.

This

represents a gain of 53.6 per cent or, annually, an increase
of about $250,000,000 in what Latin America pays the United
1

States for goods.
Thus the record of inter-American trade for the first
six months of the war, albeit profitable, should be the cause
of much legitimate concern.

For North American traders were

taking their profit, and at a pace that soon would exhaust the
ability of the Latin American states to pay for United States
goods.

These first six months showed that the United States

could readily supply Latin America's demand for products,
1

Trueblood, "Economic Defense of the !mer icas, n Foreign
Policy Reports, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1940), 133.
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usually obtained but not then available, from abroad.

But the

period also showed that the United States did not take the place
of Latin America's lost customers.
The development of hemispheric economic solidarity is
twofold.

On the one side, the problem for the United States is

to fill the largest possible amount of import requirements from
Latin Americaj.on the other side, the problem for Latin America
is to find a market for surpluses which are not normally sold
in this hemisphere, without entering into political dependence
upon Europe.

For the war period at least, Latin America is

forced to trade with the United States on whatever terms she
can get, but no ephemeral Pan American ideal will keep the states
in the economic and strategic orbit of the United States after
the war; they will stay only if it is to their own economic advantage.

The Pan American states have little enthusiasm for

making financial sacrifices for the Pan American unity which
many think, with some justice, accrues benefit only to the
northern republic; the southern countries look to the United
States to make sacrifices herself.
In the past seven years, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act has been the cornerstone of economic cooperation between the
United States and other American nations.

Reciprocal agreements

are now in force with eleven of the twenty-one republics, although, significantly, the great majority of these countries
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are in the Caribbean area where dominion of the United States
is assured in any case.

Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile have

not signed trade agreement pacts.

There is little evidence

to show that these agreements work to the advantage of the
other countries.

Exports of the United States to countries

in Latin America with Which reciprocal agreements are in force
have expanded more rapidly than exports to the rest of the
world; but imports from these countries have mounted much more
slowly than the exports.

1

At the Panama Conterence in 1939, under the pressure ot
war, the American states, for the first tir:..e, did something concrete by multi-lateral agreement about their c ammon economic
problems; they created the Inter-American Financial and Economic
Advisory Committee.

At Havana, this Committee was given further

powers of an advisory nature; simultaneously, the United States
took an impressive step, President Roosevelt asking Congress
for $500,000,000 to enable the Export-Import Bank to underwrite
surplus commodities and to strengthen internal economies ot
Latin American countries.

This step, which was subsequently

approved by the Congress, had nothing to do with the grandiose
cartel plan announced earlier.

It did give the Latin American

countries some assurance of financial support; but it was a
lHoward J. Trueblood, "Progress ot Pan American Cooperation,· Foreign Policy Reports, XV, No. 23 (February 15, 1940),
297.
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short-term, emergency measure.

Essentially, these loans are

handouts, buying good will that will evaporate the moment the
dole is stopped.
As yet, the United States has not settled down to the
really ditficult task of working out a long range program tor
the rehabilitation ot the economic structures ot the Latin American nations -- through, in great measure, increasing the normal
circulation ot goods within the hemisphere; through increasing
the purchasing power ot the Latin American nations by improving
the living standard within them; through developing the Latin
American industries; through revising their antiquated financial
structure.

1

There is only one feasible solution to the question ot
what to do about South America; that is, in the tirst place, to
admit the lack of economic interdependence and the inetficacy

ot either words or good intentions to do anything about them;
and, secondly, to proceed with the difficult task of making the
ultimate selt-interest ot all the American states coincide with
that ot the United States.

Such a task is well nigh an impossible

one; even a hemisphere cannot be isolated fram the rest ot the
world. The only hope is in pursuing a starkly realistic course.
let. Fortune, XXII, No.3 (September, 1940), Ill.
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The tirst step should be recognition that the realistic
course is not, in this case, the protitable one.

Even at the

risk ot eliminating some marginal producers in the United States
and at the cost ot angering some sectional interests, an immediate downward hauling ot United States tariffs would be a laudable
first step.

The use ot quotas and preferential taritfs, like

those now given Cuban sugar, would do much to relieve the pressure ot South and Central American surpluses.

The United States

market for agricultural and pastoral products has not been exhausted by any means; the products have simply not been made
available.

They could be admitted without any great injury to

domestic producers.
The most important ot these products trom the viewpoint
of continental relations is Argentine beef.

If the United States

would take from Argentina only two per cent of our total meat consumption, it would provide a market for one-third of that country's meat exports and do much good in easing her ditficulties.
What especially hurts in this case is what President Roosevelt,
himself, has called an "obvious inequity" -- the quarantining
of Argentine beef under the Smoot-Hawley taritf clause which
bars all meat from countries intected with contagious cattle
diseases.

Although large areas ot Argentina are intected with

the toot-and-mouth disease, Patagonia is not, and Argentina
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has rightly and mightily resented a quarantine based on
indefensible biological grounds.

The Argentine rancher on

the rolling pampas thinks he has good cause to continue to
sneer at such sentimental abstraction as "hemisphere solidarity" in the face of the fact that the Senate has refused
to ratify the Sanitary Convention, which would have rectified
the error of the quarantine and allowed healthy Argentine
beef into the country.

1

In the long run, the surest defense of the hemisphere
lies in expanding the inter- and intra-American trade -- in
speeding up the north and south circulation of goods.

To do

this, it is necessary, above all things, to raise the extremely
low South American standard of living.

The per capita national

income of Chile, for example, is $77.00 as compared with $537
in the United States
of the Amerioan states.

and Chile is by no means the poorest
The job would reauire a gigantic

capital inflow from the United States.

In the faoe of de-

faulted debts and foreign expropriations, prospects of private
oapital undertaking the job are not very good.

Nevertheless,

the task is not insurmountable; for the consummation of the
solidarity ideal, it must be aooomplished.

Money invested in

Latin America tor developing a more diversified agriculture,
thereby widening the economio base; for building new manufacturing
1

~.,

p. 113.
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centers, thereby reducing dependence upon imports, for tmproving
the deplorable transportation system, thereby increasing the
circulation ot goods -- would lift the purchasing power of
Latin America beyond its present level and give it a tendency
1

to sustain a stability of its own.
Only two agencies are now functioning to stimulate enterprises of this sort -- the Inter-American Bank, which grew out
of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee,
and the Export-Import Bank of the United States.

The for.mer,

however, is more or less defunct due to the fact that the American republics, with customary disregard of pledges, have not
put up the capital they were supposed to; the American Bank
remains the only institution geared to till the

~p.

The bank

has made loans to Brazil and Argentina, notably for internal
improvements, on the principle of "helping the countries to
help themselves."

Yet much remains to be done in the field.

Outstanding commercial possibility of them all is the iron are
deposits in Brazil.

Rubber, which is indigenous to the tropics

ot South America, but which is now cultivated there in relative2

ly small quantities, presents another tantalizing problem.

In the face of the enor.mity at the economic task that
clearly faces the United States, measures that have been taken
lIbido
2 Ibid., p. 115

-
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seem dwarfed and insignificant.

Indeed, neither the Reciprocal

Trade Acts nor the Export-Import Bank move even appreciably in
the direction of permanent solution.

Loans, in great part, are

stop-gap measures; trade agreements tend to the advantage of
the United States and do not appreciably increase the needed
economic stability of the contracting countries.

On the con-

trary, both these measures make the United States vulnerable
to the charge that she is attempting to keep the Pan American
states in a stage of eoonOIi1ic dependenoe.
however, implies a

delib~rate

1

Suoh critioism,

sabotage of inter-American economic

relations, which does not seem to exist; rather, the evidence
indicates a lack of willingness to recognize and to overcome the
obstacles that stand in the path of true economic solidarity.
Continued paternalism is not the answer.

Neither does

the answer lie in fluent fancies dwelling upon the merits of
free trade, which exists no place in the world and almost least
of all where the United States is concerned.

Nor does it lie

in stentorian derogation of Nazi trade policies.
ference between the barter

~stem

The only dif-

of Germany and the tariff and

loan policy of the United States is that the for.mer is a far
more efficient type of subsidy.

Only an immediate definition

of objectives and a sober appraisal of the means for attaining
1

Cf. Beals,

~.~.J

p. 266.
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desired ends wUl solve the problem.

What is appalling now is

the lack ot coordinated ettort, the dependence on verbal solutions and temporary measures, the insistence on protits when
strategic considerations should be paramount.
The problem ot the debts ot the Pan American states
must be solved betore any real economic solidarity can be achieved.
"A tactor ten t!mea as important as allY reciprocal trade agreeI

ment,"

the debts have not lieen considered a t any ot the meetings

ot the American states.

At Montevideo, Puig Casauranc ot Mexico

pointed out the tundamental importance ot the debts time and
time again.

Betore the Committee ot Initiatives, December 4, 1933,

Puig asked:

"Could it be regarded inopportune, barren or foolish

that at a meeting where twenty debtor countries are represented
this theme ot so great importance should be looked into? • • • • "
The Mexican

delegate~id

that when bankers place loans

No care is given then to the need soon to rise torcing
all kinds ot restrictions on international commerce in
order that the debt obligations be fulfilled, and no importance is attached to the condition devolving upon our
peoples who are forced to live a miserable life, bearing
with a tremendous depression • • • • the outflow of our
insignificant metallic reserves in the service of these
debts. And when we fail to observe our debt obligations
religiously, the reasons that we have tor so acting are not
looked into. We ar~ merely blamed tor not living up to our
sacred commitments!
1

Ie.!!.,

p. 268.

2Quoted in

..!ill.., p. 269.
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The Mexican delegate was making no attack on the United
States for, he said, those who had wrought so much evil in
America had also been "victims of their own absurd monetary and
credit system."

Despite this reasonable stand, his proposal to

consider the matter was entirely smothered; nor was it again
broached at the subsequent Lima meeting.
Ignoring such fundamental considerations, the United
States has shown bad planning in its attempts at constructive
measures.

The best example ot this lack of foresight was the

announcement of the cartel plan in June, 1940, the complete
dropping ot the plan in August of the same year.

The plan was

not dropped because of the criticisms of the Pan American states,
who feared the control that would be exercised over their internal economies; the cartel was dropped because finanCing such
a plan might mean a loss of from $150,000,000 to $300,000,000
annually to the United States.

That the potent ob.1 ections on

either side were not anticipated is a sad commentary on the
leadership of the Pan American policy of the United States.

The

fact that possible 108s to the United States was the paramount
oonsideration in dropping the plan again demonstrates that
economic oonsiderations still control the political ends this
oountry is trying to achieve in the Americas.
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During the imperialistic stage of this country's Pan
American policy, the use of political means was most frequently
directed at economic ends.

By a strange quirk of history, the

situation is now exactly reversed; the economic policy of the
United States in Central and South America is primarily directed
by political strategy and toward political ends.

In the former

days, the United States had not learned that it could not kill
the goose and continue to collect golden eggs; today, the United
States has not realized that good politics may mean bad business,
that, in a word, political solidarity may have to be gained at
the expense of business profits.

At the beginning of the Roose-

velt administration, the Good Neighbor policy was synonymous
with good (meaning profitable) business; in the foreseeable
future, this symbiosis might reestablish itself.

It is in the

current intermediary stage of political emergency that the two
factors become divergent.
The attainment of political unity in the Americas is
all-important; it is important during the war and will be important after the war, no matter who the victor.

Achievement

of this political end is worth almost any economic loss.

The

fallacy of the current policy of the United States lies in the
fact that it is risking the same loss, through more loans to
the southern nat ions, without attaining the permanent ends that
the more fundamental economic measures could accomplish.

CHAPTER VII
FACTORS FOR AND AGAINST SOLIDARITY

CHAPTER l'II
FACTORS FOR AND AGAINST SOLTI>ARITY

From the viewpoint of their own defense, the nations
of Central and South America, individually, do not constitute
either positive or potent forces; acting together, these nations
have some power and a certain significance; in collaboration
with the United States, they would command an invincible power.
It is this truism that makes tbe success of the Pan American
movement a challenge to the Americas.

What forms have been.

created and what forces are effective to implement the Pan
American ideal?

What factors are in play to discredit, or even

to destroy, this ideal?
Examination of documents adopted by the Oonferences of
American states reveals certain doctrines, so frequently reaffirmed that they must be recognized as tundamental to the
American system.

In truth, these doctrines are essential to

any international cooperation dependent upon mutual good will
and respect, and voluntary participation.
1.

Thus:

The American states have repeatedly insisted that

international relations must be conducted in accordance with the
rules ot international law.

They have recognized the necessity

ot fostering the development ot that law, and they have embodied
not a tew ot its recognized doctrines in treaties and conventions.

They have given much attention to evolving suitable methods for
codification and have created various agenoies for that purpose.
2.

The American states have constantly stood, in theory,

for the settlement of international disputes by the pacific methods available in the law they have created.

They have adopted

numerous conventions and other instruments to foster the peaceful solution of their controversies and have made available such
measures as diplomatic negotiations, good offices, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, consultation, investigation by commissions, and judicial settlement.

In the Treaty on the Preven-

tion of Controversies, signed in 1938, they have set up a procedure for the prevention of international disputes through the
elimination of the causes of future controversies.
3.

The American states have repeatedly repudiated the

so-called rights of aggression and conquest.

They have declared

aggression an "international crime," have renounced the use ot
force as an instrument ot policy, and have stated that they will
not recognize the legal validity of acquisitions of territory
through conquest or other non-pacific means.
4.

The American states have upheld the doctrine of non-

intervention, declaring that no nation possesses the right to
intervene in either the internal or external aftairs of another
states and have buttressed this declaration by further asserting
that intervention, whether direct or indirect, is inadmissible
on any grounds whatsoever.
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5.

The dootrine of the juridioal equality of states

has, in later years, been repeatedly asserted.

In the Amerioan

system, all states, large or small, possess the same rights and
an equal legal oapaoity, irrespeotive of power and wealth.
6.

The Amerioan states stand for the basio dootrine of

the sanotity of international treaties and have insisted, at
their meetings, that international engagements must be respeoted,
and revised only by the agreement of the oontraoting parties.

1

In addition to these purely legal me.asures, the Amerioan
states have taken further steps that, in the summing up, must be
oounted as factors making for unity.
7.

On numerous occasions they have asserted their soli-

darity in adherenoe to republican governments and demooratic
freedoms.
8.

The American states have enunoiated a polioy of mutual

oonoern, affirming that a danger to one is a danger to all; that
a threat to the security of one is a threat to the security of
all.
9.

In a time of international orisis, the American states

have demonstrated the effeotiveness of their oonsultative prooess
by meeting promptly and aoting in unanimity.
10.

In an emergenoy that threatens their economio well-

being, they have made serious attempts to solve their problems
lFirst six points adapted from prefatory note of George
A. Finoh in The International Conferences of Amerioan States,
pp. ix-xii. ----
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by mutual action -- by the promotion ot a treer exchange ot
goods through adherence to a liberal trade policy, and through
other means ot colleotive planning and collective action.
11.

As a further emergency measure the states ot the

Amerioas have taken, atter consultation, a common policy in
regard to their neutrality and have adopted a oommon oourse ot
action in the tace ot a common danger; namely, the oontingency

ot an attempted transter ot American territory held by a nonAmerican state.
12.

Furthermore, the American nations have ooneerned

themselves in innumerable ways with the promotion ot social wellbe ing and cultural under standing.
13.

Finally, there are potent ideologioal factors con-

duoive to strong Pan Americanism.

As inhabitants of a cammon

continent, which is somewhat detached geographically from the
rest ot the world, there is a naturally strong feeling that
common isolation calls for mutual cooperation, that in order
to proteot themselves against aggression, the nations of America
must be united by strong ties, and that, having once won their
political liberty, they must adopt etfective methods to preserve it.

It action were suited to the word, there would be no
problem ot Pan American solidarity.

It assumptions on whioh
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the words are predicated were true, there would be no hesitation
in pronouncing inter-American solidarity a fact rather than suspecting it a fancy.

It is necessary to delve beneath the camou-

flage of words and to expose the fallacy of glib assumption.
1.

The greatest contrast exists between what the dele-

gates of the Pan American nations promise to do at their Conferences, and what is actually done by the governments of those
nations in the interims.

Consider only the most important of

the treaties and conventions' signed at the Conferences', those
designed to maintain peace and to avert hostilities.

(See chart,

on page 102.)
The very tirst ot these conventions was signed at the
Fourth Congress in 1910 and concerned the settlement of pecuniary
claims; as ot January 1, 1941, only eleven of the American states
had ratified this convention.

The important Protocol of Pro-

gressive Arbitration (Washington, 1929) has been ratitied by
only nine states; the anti-war pact of Saavedra Lamas (Rio de
Janeiro, 1933) has been ratified by nineteen states but is
rather hopelessly encumbered by reservations of eight countries;
the Additional Protocol to the Conciliation Convention ot 1929
(Montevideo, 1933) has been ratified by only nine states; the
Convention on the Prevention ot Controversies (Buenos Aires, 1936)
has been ratified by fourteen states.

The record of ratification

I
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for the other treaties is somewhat better, the Gondra Treaty
Santiago, 1923) having nineteen signatories.

The Anti-War

Treaty of Non-Aggression (Montevideo, 1933); the Convention
on Good Offices and Mediation (Buenos Aires, 1935); the Treaty
on Inter-American Arbitration (Washington, 1929); the Treaty
on Inter-American Conciliation (Washington, 1929); and the
Treaty for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment
of Peace (Buenos Aires, 1935), all have fifteen or more rati1

fications.
2.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the

peace machinery of the important treaties is confused and overlapping and by the further tact that all efforts at simplification and integration have been entirely unsuccessful.

As things

stand now, should conflict arise, there is a good chance that
the disputing parties may not be signatories to the same treaties
or conventions, and in the resulting confusion over which peace
machinery is to be used, none will operate effectively.
lFrancis Wilcox in his study, The Ratification of International Conventions (London: Unwin Brothers, 1935), suggests
that "largely because the Pan American Union has not been vigorous
or consistent in its action to secure ratifications from member
states, its conventions have not been widely accepted." p. 219.
Though this factor undoubtedly plays its part, one is inclined
to believe that truer causes for non-ratification are more
fundamental: that (1) the American states do not consider the
conventions important enough to merit putting them through ratification procedures, and/or (2) the states do not find the conventions consistent with national policies.
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3.

The same oonfusing situation exists for the problem

of the oodifioation ot international law, with no less than five
permanent oommittees at work in addition to a oommittee within
1

eaoh of the twenty-one nations.
4.

Though in reoent years the preoooupation with in-

terna1 matters by the Pan American states has made for a 1aok
of important political controTersies among them, the Chaoo dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia is an example par excellence
of the disinolination ot these southern states to settle their
important international disputes by means of the pacifio methods
available in laws they have created.

No two nations had greater

opportunities to avail themselves of peaceful means, yet the deoision was made on the battlefield and to the victor in arms went
the spoils.

And with Latin Amerioa arming at a paoe unequalled

ever before in its history, there is muoh oause for believing
that new inter-American oonf1iots will arise in the future.
Brazil and Argentina are the natural rivals on the South Amerioan
oontinent and, aooording to at least one able commentator, are
spoiling for the opportunity to
n

• •

~t

at eaoh other's throats •

• • Great Argentina, with its satellite bufter states, plus

Peru, on the one hand, and Brazil, with its tie-up with Colombia,
~he progress ot the law oodifioation, though slow, is
steady. As a whole, this work is one ot the tew unmitigated
assets of Pan Amerioan relations.
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Ecuador and Chile, on the other, are two powerful divisions that
endanger the peace of the continent and the world." 1

Ironically,

if the war does come, it will be tought with arms now be ing supplied by the United States.
5.

Despite the tact that there is cause tor believing

the sinoerity 01' President Roosevelt in his non-intervention
stand tor the United States, the polioy has been checkered, to
say the least, even since the beginning of Roosevelt's administration.

2

The prime example is Cv.ba, in 1933, when this country,

in order to a void one revolution, aided in overthrowing Machado
and in setting up the De Caspedes puppet government which, despite Mr. Sumner Welles' attempt at oonstitution writing, was
overthrown in less than two weeks.

The new government was

trankly leftist in nature, and recognition was withheld while
thirty American naval vessels were rushed to the scene and every
pressure was exerted to destroy the government ot Grau San Martin.
The United States embassy, with Mr. Welles on the scene tor a
while, became a oenter 01' conspiracy; General Batista, with the
support 01' the United States, was able to overthrow the Grau
San Martin government, which was slowly but surely gainin-g
popular strength.
United States.

~eals,

between Peru
duly 7.
2

01'

Batista was 1Jmn.edia tely reoognized by the

"The only conclusion must be tbat, despite the
.2::Q..

c it., p. 347. Announcement 01' tight ing
was announced in the newspapers ot

and~cuador

Ct. supra, p. 23. Argentina's own peculiar conception
non-intervention in the Chaco has also been noted; intra, p. 21.
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repeal ot the Platt amendment, and the enunciation of the new
Roosevelt policy, the old yardstick of stability by force and
intervention was utilized."

1

Although strict adherence to the non-intervention policy
in the case of the recent Mexican oil expropriation is more
laudable than this country's action in the Cuban incident, reprisals of the United States, in the form of the cessation of
silver purchases, has worked great hardships on our closest
southern neighbor.

o.

2

Petruchio would have had less trouble in proving

to the entire world that the moon was made of green cheese than
the Pan American states will have in demonstrating their cultural
unity.

The truth of the matter is that no such unity exists;

the very fact that the delegates to the Conferences must have
speeches transcribed into four languages before they know whether
to applaud or to disapprove is one proof of this.

Aside trom

the major difficulty of language ditferences, the peoples ot
the two Americas are contronted with dissimilarities ot disposition, ways ot doing business, historic and cultural traditions, race problems, cultural heritages, religion, and living
standards.

The surprising tact is that the Central and South

American nations ditfer almost as much among themselves in
lBeals, 232.- ill., p. 236. Trenchant criticism ot the
policy ot the United States in this matter is quoted by Beals
trom several Latin American newspapers.
2~exico in Revolution," Fortune, XVIII, No.4 (October,

1938), p. 114.
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these respects as they all differ trom the United States.

Nor

can the several hundred resolutions that have been passed at the
various meetings of the countries do a great deal to mitigate
the situation.
7.

As inhabitants of the same detached continent, the

people of the Americas would seem to have a natural incentive
for mutual interests and mutual cooperation.

But a stronger,

more intense feeling of mutuality pulling in the opposite direction is the sentiment of the groups which were at one time
politically united and where to some extent this feeling for
unity still flourishes.

Thus there are groups in the countries

of the River Plata region, the states of Central America, the
constituents of old Great Colombia, and the members of the
Peru-Bolivia Federation that aspire to their former unity and
consec.uently exercise disintegrating functions in the larger
solidarity movement.
S.

1

The problem of the competing economies of the

American states is an ever-present and an all-important one;
to date, no appreciable steps have been taken in the direction
of any per.manent solution.
9.

The biggest paradox of all in the problem of inter-

American unity is the discrepancy between the ideal of democracy
1 Alfaro,

~. ~.,

p. 73.
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and the faot of diotatorship.

President Roosevelt's advooaoy

of demooratio and oonstitutional government in the Western
Hemisphere, if aooepted at its faoe value and not as so muoh
diplomatic palaver, would be dangerous dootrine seriously
threatening the peaoe of Latin America.

His words are a oall

for mass revolution in most of the twenty states south of the
Rio Grande.

Though the picture changes with the utmost rapidity

(mostly for the worse) and exaot information is diffioult to obtain, the more one studies, the more one comes to the conolusion
that the so-oalled demooraoies of the south are, in faot, del

oidedly undemocratic.
The southern republios have their own peculiar kind of
diotatorship; but this does not signify that they are not oorrupt, overbearing, and despotic.

Brazil is a good example.

Getulio Vargas, from all aocounts, is a good-humored buffoon
of sorts, not censoring, and even enjoying the many unoomplimentary j okes about himself.

Most of these Jests have to do

with Getulio's stranglehold on the presidency (nearly eleven
years in offioe to date).

Typical is the one about a newly-

minted small coin bearing Getulio's profile.

The joke:

have to invent a new and more powerful purgative, now."

"They'll
HWhy?"

-

"Beoause when baby swallows that -- well, you know how hard it
lMr. Beals affirms, furthermore, that the southern
oountries are led by "one of the world's prize oollections of
diplomatic outthroats."

is to get Getulio out!"

1

This certainly would never be a llowed in Germany; but
this does not detract trom the fact that the Brazilian constitution allows the president supreme power of the state.

He

has the right to initiate laws and the authority to suspend
the national congress and to dictate legislation by decree; he
can intervene in state governments, suspending legislatures
and ruling through hand-picked federal commissioners; and he
?
can hold office indefinitely.
He makes use of all these powers
as well as the usual coercive measures to suppress political
opposition.

This is Roosevelt's

~y

friend, President Vargas."

At least as bad as the Brazilian dictatorship are, by
the latest count, those of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,

\i

Santo Domingo, Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru,
Paraguay, Bolivia, and Argentina.

In the mild dictatorship

group fall Venezuela and Chile while Costa Rica, Colombia,
Uruguay, and Mexico seem to be the only Pan American strongholds
3

of even faint democracy.

Hostilities abroad have halted the

threat of German penetration Which had gained steadily from 1934
until 1939, but the large group of dictatorships remains to water
the strength of Western Hemisphere democracy.
lFortune, XIX, No.1 (January, 1939), 32.
!Stephen Nast, "Fascism and Communism in South America,"
Foreign Policy Reports, XIII, No. 19 (December 15, 1937), 228-9.
3From a confidential report by John Gunther at a meeting
of the Foreign Policy Association. Undated, mimeographed.
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10.

As a result of this penchant for despotism, which,

by the way, is partly the result of ine:t'ficient and weak democratic forms, the Latin American states are a most fertile and
receptive field for the Fascist economic, cultural, and political
infiltration.

The range of activities of foreign propaganda

agencies is a truly amazing story; that such activities have
not been thoroughly scotched is an insight into the governments,
1
themselves.
11.

Lack of sincerity on the part of the Latin American

nations in supporting real continental solidarity is indicated by
the fact that only fourteen countries have bothered to ratify
the convention setting up the secretariat for inter-American relations, the Pan American Union.

The treaty establishing the

Union to promote oooperation on "moral" rather than political
grounds was signed in 1928; after thirteen years, the Unio11. still
operates by resolution and not by law.
12.

That the Pan American Union works under the legal

fiction of fostering "moral" as opposed to "political" oooperation is another indication of the organizational defect in
inter-Amerioan relations.

Casting the light of the first group of faotors against
the shadow of the second reveals no encouraging pattern.

It is

IDavid Efron, WLatin America and the Fascist Holy Alliance,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
CCIV (Jury~939), 17-25.
----
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obvious that dur ing the quest for

inter-~..merican

solidarity

some obstacles have been overcome; but many have been circumvented, many others ignored.
During the last decade, many impediments to harmonious
relations have been removed.

Intervention has been abandoned,

at least as an avowed policy, by the United States, and this
country's military might has been withdrawn trom all Latin
American countries.

The United States has reversed its former

policy with regard to recognition and has led the movement in
the establishment of peace machinery for the hemisphere.

The

Monroe Doctrine has been continentalized; "dollar diplomacy"
and "paternalism" have given away to the "Good Neighbor."
In sum, much has been done to promote mutual good will and to
remove traditional causes ot distrust.
Good will and mutual trust, however, are nothing but
prerequisites for the attainment ot a real degree of economic
and political unity tor the nations and peoples ot the Western
Hemisphere.

The question is whether the springboard ot ac-

complishments-to-date is strong enough to carry the nations ot
the hemisphere over the political, economic, and cultural morass
that must be hurdled it Pan American solidarity is to became a
permanent reality and not to remain a verbal will-o'-the-wisp.

CHAPTER VIII
IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER VIII
IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS
Many proposals for further strengthening inter-American
solidarity have been made; most of these have been directed at
creating an actual League of American States.

The basic idea

of real union was, in fact, germinated by the very first conference of Central American states convened by Bolivar in 1826.
Woodrow Wilson was probably the modern progenitor of the idea,
first disclosing it in a speech and later broaching it in a
circular telegram to the Latin American nations in the winter
of 1916.

The war intervened, and the political union was next

brought forward by Dr. Baltasar Brum,
President of Uruguay, in
I
1~20;

President Brum published a draft of his plan which he

hoped would be considered at the Fifth Conference of American
States at Santiago in 1923.

This consideration, however, did

not take place.
A meeting held in Panama in 1926 to celebrate the centenary of the first Congress passed a resolution recommending
the oonsideration of political union at the Sixth Conference;
the Havana conclave, however, did not even have the topic on
the agenda.

Salvador was rumored to be preparing a plan for

the Montevideo Conference, but again the topic was not found
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on the program.

Both Colombia and the Dominioan Republio had

drafts presented at Buenos Aires in 1936, however; these,it
has been noted, were referred to the next Conferenoe although
six or seven states showed a disposition to disouss the matter
favorably.

Sinoe then, oonsideration of the politioal union

idea has been postponed from meeting to meeting.

1

It is signifioant that most of the measures that have
been considered for strengthening the solidarity of the Amerioan
states plaoe their emphasis on- improving formal struoture.

One

aspeot of this is the preoooupation with peaoe plans; another
is the emphasis plaoed on formal ratifioation of t~ties.

And

this gives rise to a fundamental oritioism of the attempt to
establish inter-Amerioan solidarity.
The point is this: all the maohinery for peaoe that oan
be oonoocted, all the ratifioations of peaoe paots that oan be
seoured, all the paraphernalia of organization that can be set
up will not be suffioient either to establish solidarity or to
insure peace.

A peaoe plan is only as good as the intent of its

members; there oan be no peaoe unless the will for peaoe is
present and the national polioies of states follow pacifio ohannels.

If ever an historical lesson were olear, it is the one

that the disintegration of the League of Nations has taught.
Causes for the breakdown of the European system of co lleotive
aotion are to be found neither in the disutility of League
lA complete disoussion of the idea of a League of
Amerioan States is in Alfaro, ~. oit., pp. 74-90.
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maohinery nor in the non-existence ot League torce; that
breakdown was caused by the sabotage ot the League ideal
through the disinolination ot its members to deal directly,
simply, and torthrightly with problems ot territory, armaments,
economic imperialism, and nationalistic jingo.
The sad tact is that America seems to be repeating
Europe's grievous error.

There can be no denial ot the proposi-

tion that an actual political union ot Amerioan states is a desired eventuality.

But no suoh union can hope to achieve suc-

cess in establishing permanent peaoe until its constituent
members have tirst achieved a mutual basis ot actio..

The

evidence indicates that this basis does not now exist in the
Americas; nor will the superimposition ot any new machinery
on that already existing provide, ipso taoto, the essential
mutuality.

This mutuality can only be achieved through the

removal ot the basic causes tor dissent.

Organization may aid

in the removal, but, in any case, the tirst step is honest intent and a willingness on the part ot American nations to submerge national interests to the inter-American good.
In the Americas, no less than 1m Europe, the problem
is complicated by divergent cultures, language, and economies.
In America, unlike Europe, it is tair to say that the entire
success ot the plan depends upon the actions ot one nation, the
United states.

It is possible that the polioy ot other American
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states, Argentina, for example, could make eventual interAmerican solidarity a difficult aocomplishment; without realistic action from the United States, however, real solidarity is
entirely impossible.
Since 1932, the strengthening of Pan American solidarity
has been advocated and furthered by the United States as one aspect of its foreign policy.

Other countries of the hemisphere,

notably those of the Caribbean region, have stood solidly behind
the United States in this policy.

If still others, notably the

Argentine bloc, have seemed non-cooperative, and even obstructive,
it is because Pan Americanism is no unmixed blessing.
One of the primary purposes of the movement is the achievement of peace on this continent; it is strikingly obvious, however, that if the Pan American nations allow themselves to be
aligned in the close political cooperation that this country's
State Department now advocates, they may very well find themselves embroiled in an unwanted war on another continent.
At the same t!me, even within the hemisphere, the South
American states cannot be censured for viewing with alarm the
dangerous inconsistencies of the foreign and economic policies
of the United States.

The lack of foresight on the part of the

leaders of this country is astounding to contemplate.

The

strong advocacy of a cartel plan for marketing surpluses and
its sudden dropping is a good example in the economic sphere;
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nor have the final results of our eoonomio planning been viewed
with any universal approval.

Following the Havana Conferenoe,

Dr. Leopoldo Melo, head of the Argentine delegation, was forthright in saying that the United States· proposals for the absorption of surpluses were superfioial and of fleeting benefit;
the Conferenoe failed, he asserted, to bring forward any far1
reaching general plan for oontinuous eoonomio oollaboration.
Though this attitude may be viewed a s an expression of truoulenoe from Amerioa· s chief rival for leadership in inter.Amerioan affairs, the very faot that Argentina is in this
position gives the United States greater reason to bring her
into the 1'0 ld.
Political see-sawing by the United States is oause for
even greater justifiable alarm.

Consider the fact, for example,

that in Ig39, at Panama, the advocacy of the United States was
responsible for a General Declaration of Neutrality whioh provided, among other things, against "the fitting out, arming, or
augmenting • • • • the forces or armament of any ship or vessel
to be employed in the servioe of one of the belligerents."
Consider the further faot that a little more than a year later,
the President of the United States made uee of powers given him.
by Congress to do precisely these things the oountry had pledged
itself to prevent!
INew
York Times, July 31, 1940, p. 4.
--..;;..;:;::;;;;;.;;.,;;;.
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If solidarity were complete, the foreign polioy of
the United States would be bringing the entire hemisphere
instead of just this country olose to outright belligerency
in the European war.

But the Pan Amerioan countries, like the

United States, pledged themselves to neutrality; unlike the
United States, many of these countries have seen no reason,
oonsistent with their own national self-interest, to alter
that pledge.

This is an extraordinarily strong ind;ioation of

a fundamental d isuni ty in 'the policies of the states of the two
Americas.

This disunity was concretely demonstrated when, in

April, 1941, the United States seized Ger.man, Italian, and
Danish ships within her ports.

The newspapers of the United

States gave great space to the action of the Central American
nations and of

Per~

similar seizures.

in following this country's action with

But the significant and disappointing fact

was that neither Colombia nor Brazil nor Chile nor Argentina
backed the United States with like action.
Only one conclusion oan be drawn.

1

Towards the Americas,

the United States pursues a policy of solidarity; towards
Europe and its war, the United States takes definite sides and
fast approaches a state of outright belligerency.

The two

policies are inconsistent and antagonistic, and the result is
a dilemma of the most acute variety.

Insofar as we pursue one

policy, we inevitably weaken the other.
lpan-American News, Bi-weekly Information Service
(Washington: ForeIgn Fc)lIcy Association, April 10, 1941) ,
II, No.5, 1.
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Further evidence of disunity in the Americas, caused
by action of the United States in her program of defense, was
revealed by the destroyer trade for naval bases with Great
Britain.

The southern

co~tries

viewed this action with alarm.

Said a Colombia paper, spokesman of the Conservative party:
At Havana an agreement was solemnly reached to put any
transferred European possession under Pan American trusteeship. We do not doubt the need of the United States for
certain additional bases, but the present Roosevelt program
ot utilizing the dire straits of the collapsing British
Empire to seize suoh bases without consulting the rest ot
the oontinent • • • • is neither demooratio nor honest • • • •
We talked at Havana at joint continental defense. Instead,
Roosevelt rushed to Canada to make an alliance, with dangerous war implioations, quite apart fram the rest ot the two
continents • • • • How long is Latin America going to continue to take stook in hypocritical and talse-front PanAmerioan oonferences?"
And another Central American organ, oommenting on the
same matter, concluded:

~aziism

is a remote and passing menace.

Yankeeism is an immediate and permanent menaoe, now and for all
time."

1

Though Seoretary Hull, perhaps stung by the storm of

criticism, hastened to announce that the new bases would be put
at the disposition of the Latin American states, the implications
of our European policy are negating the good will created by the
administration before the war.
states is altogether natural.

This reaction of the Pan American
The times very strongly hint that

the United States is indulging in new imperialistic ventures and
oalling them, this time,

~asures

of defense."

lCarleton Beals, ~-Amerioa (Boston:
Company, 1940), p. 441.

Houghton Mifflin
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The solution does not lie in putting a stop to defensive
measures tor the hemisphere.

Rather the southern countries must

be taken into tull partnership tor the protection ot the two continents.

That there is no single agency coordinating or consoli-

dating the military and strategic planning ot the twenty-one
nations demonstrates that not even the first adequate step has
been taken toward this c ammon-sense goal.
Yet even this cooperation, in the tinal analysis, would
not materially add to the permanent achievement ot Pan American
solidarity.

An interesting concomitant ot the dilemma taced

by the United States due to its contlicting toreign policies
in Europe and in America is the program ot combating dictatorships across the Atlantic while cooperating wi th them. below
the Rio Grande.

Recent history, especially, seems clearly to

point out that collaboration with personal rulers is an unhealthy
marriage ot convenience.

Consequently, appeasement in the

European phase ot this country's toreign policy is viewed with
scorn as an unrealistic course; yet in the Americas, United
States policy is precisely one ot appeasement.

There is no

reason to believe that the American brand ot dictatorship will
not run true to torm, and that the American dictators will not
utilize cooperation ot the United States only to the extent that
it turthers their own rule-by-force and their own personal ambition.
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From this observation follows the first of two
fundamental policies for the United States on whioh genuine
and lasting inter-American solidarity must be based: a deeper
regard must be shown for the people of Central and South America
rather than for their unrepresentative, tyrannical governments.
This regard might be shown, for example, by the United States
demonstrating an interest in the welfare of liberal movements
within the states, or by the United States engaging in a positive effort to raise the living standard of all the peoples
of these regions.

The problem is a ticklish one; but in the

end, .1t will be impossible to defend Latin Amerioa against
totalitarian influences unless the people of Latin America are
allowed to share equally in the larger freedom that the United
States seeks to preserve.
Concomitant with this stand is the second foundation
stone for realistio aotion in the attainment of solidarity;
the oonception that trade is c onduoted solely for profit must
be abandoned, and the United States must adopt a criterion ot
trade aimed a.t meeting the needs ot the people ot the Central
and South American oountries.

Under the present policy, the

Southern Americas have only the choioe ot becoming economic
dependents of either Europe or the United States; there is no
cause tor their showing preference tor the latter dependency.
Measures that wUl round out and strengthen the internal
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eoonomies of the Pan Amerioan states, that will raise the
living standard of their peoples, that will deal with the
surplus oommodity problem on a mutually advantageous basis,
that will increase the flow of goods between the Americas
only these measures sponsored by the Unit ed states will
achieve the solidarity ideal.

The results, too, might do

more than anything else for the cause of political democracy.
In the short view of things, suoh a policy will result in an

economic loss to the United States; but long-ter.m results will
be a thousand times worth the investment.
Success of inter-American solidarity depends upon the
extent to which the United States pursues this twofold policy.
The importanoe of stronger, formal political ties, of oontinued
cultural and intellectual oooperation, of peace pacts, and of
juridioal action cannot be doubted; these matters, however, pale
to relative insignifioance in a view of the total situation.
There is no cause for optimisn over the eventual outcome.
The ourrent predominant interest of the leaders of the United
States in the affairs of Europe has led them to relegate the
affairs of Amerioa to a minor ring in the big show, and has
kept them from making effective and adequate use of the opportunities created by those same European affairs.

As late as

May 26, 1941, President Roosevelt epitomized the verbal attitude of this oountry's statesmen by saying:

"Now, as never
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before, the unity of the American republics is of supreme
importance to each and every one of us and to the cause of
freedom throughout the world.

Our tuture independence is bound
1

up with the future independence of all of our sister republics."
The words are true, but 'Nords are easy; deeds are needed,
but deeds are difficult.
1

The Courier-Journal, May 27, 1941, p. 8.
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